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LOCALMULTIDEM

Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants' Social Capital in Europe:
Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level

SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH PROJECT (STREP)

PRIORITY 7: Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society

Deliverable D5_b: City reports on Discursive Indicators

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Table of Contents

Presentation.....	p. 2
Budapest.....	p. 3
London	p. 21
Lyon	p. 28
Madrid	p. 40
Zurich	p. 60
Milan	p. 89

PRESENTATION

This deliverable contains all the city reports on the discursive opportunity structure under the frame of Workpackage 1.¹ The general aim of this workpackage is to capture the discursive dimension of the political opportunity structure impacting upon migrants' political integration at the local level. Attention is focused on any form of public claim-making, including purely discursive forms such as public statements, press releases and conferences, publications, or interviews, alongside conventional forms of political action (for example, litigation and petitioning) and protest forms.

Drawing on scholarly results of the MERCI project,² we have defined an instance of claim making (shorthand: a claim) as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. This consists of *the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors.*

Each city dataset has uniformly been built through collection of discursive interventions. Coding has broken the structure of claims into six elements, namely, the location of the claim in time and space, the actor making the claim, the form of claim, the addressee of claim (at whom is the claim directed?), the substantive issue of claim (what is the claim about?), and the object actor who is or would be affected by the claim. In addition, we have also coded some valuable information on the 'position towards the object' so as to evaluate which actors intervene more explicitly in favour or against the interests of migrants.

Discursive interventions were selected when referring to the country under study. Reactions abroad to claims occurring in the country of coding have been excluded, alongside with any other claim that has no reference to the country under study. We have coded statements by actors of the country that are made away from their country, together with any other claim by any actor made in the country itself.

This report is built on the analysis of all claims reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of one selected newspaper for each country, namely, El País (Madrid), Népszabadság (Budapest), Le Progrès (Lyon), Guardian (London), Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich), and Repubblica (Milan).³

The present document merges all the country reports. The analysis and the comparative study will be carried out in another document: the integrated report (Deliverable 7_b).

¹ The coordination of this report is the responsibility of the French team (FNSP-CEVIPOF). This report has been coordinated and edited at various stages by Manlio Cinalli, research director of the French LOCALMULTIDEM team.

² Information available online at http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/mit/people/koopmans_recent_projects.en.htm.

³ Coding of El País has included the Sunday issues (available for this newspaper).

CITY: Budapest⁴

1. Introduction

1.1. Data collection

For the analysis of the political context in which the issues concerning migration are discussed in Hungary, the daily, *Népszabadság* (People's Freedom) has been selected. This daily newspaper has issued the most copies among all nationwide non-tabloids in 2006 according to the Hungarian Audit Bureau of Circulations.⁵ It should be stated that the selected paper is politically positioned at the centre left, rather closer to the governing socialist-liberal coalition than to the conservative opposition. Accordingly, the results of the given analysis should be interpreted in this context, therefore we argue that the data and the results of the analysis presented in this paper can only be seen as representative for the given newspaper's publicity, and not for the entire Hungarian society.

Taking all Monday, Wednesday and Friday issues of the *Népszabadság* in 2006 all together 79 claims have been coded. According to the relatively low number of claims, in several cases it is impossible to generalise the findings as there are too few observations in the different categories. As it is going to be later demonstrated the majority of these claims neither focused on the issue of migration nor have been made by migrant actors. As the presented research has only focused on the claims which *have appeared* in the media, we do not have the possibility to closer analyse the reasons for and the background of the 'invisible' claims, which might have been made by, and/or focussed on migrants. These questions can be better answered by the parallel analysis of the data sets collected in the work packages 1. on the 'institutional opportunity structure of migrants', 3. on the 'organisational network structure of migrants' and 4. concerning the 'political opportunities of migrants on the individual level'.⁶

The data collection has been carried out according to the principles set in the 'Localmultidem WP1 Codebook' by two independent coders under the supervision of Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni.

1.2. Country Specifics

1.2.1. Immigrants

As it has been demonstrated by the 'Work package 2 integrated report' on statistical data, Hungary has the lowest number and proportion of immigrants among the countries participating in the Localmultidem project.⁷

⁴ This report has been prepared by Tamás Kohut, Luca Váradi, members of the Hungarian team of the Localmultidem project.

⁵ <http://en.matesz.hu/data/?SLOT=20061&post=+get+the+data+>

⁶ See: <http://www.um.es/localmultidem/documents/descriptionfull.pdf>

⁷ Deliverable no. 6: Integrated report - The Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Immigrants in Six European Cities (WP2)

Table 1. Proportion of immigrants in the city population vs immigrants in the total country population

City	Proportion of immigrants (%) [*]	Immigrants in the country (%) ^{**}
London	50.6	7.9
Zurich	30.2	22.0
Madrid	17.9	6.5
Milan	12.5	4.1
Lyon	9.4	5.4
Budapest	3.2	1.3

^{*}Data are from 2005, except Lyon and London where the data are from 2000.

^{**}Data are from Salt (2006) except for the UK, which comes from the 2001 Census.

Furthermore the composition of the migrant group is rather peculiar compared to Western-European countries as around 80% of the foreigners come from European countries and around 70% are of ethnic Hungarian origin, which means that the overwhelming majority of the migrants do not differ significantly concerning cultural heritage and mother language from the receiving society.

1.2.2. Other minority groups

In Hungary not the migrants but the Roma form the largest and mostly rejected minority group.⁸ It can be seen throughout the analysis that in the categories of claims concerning racism, xenophobia, minority rights and participation, etc. we find claims focussing on the Roma and only in very few cases on the immigrants. When interpreting these results one may however obtain indirect information as to the situation of the migrants, as in several cases the problems of the two groups can be overlapping. (Still, these claims do not carry any information concerning the focus of our research, namely the discursive opportunity structure of the migrants.) Furthermore it should be taken into consideration that the Roma are a highly segregated and deprived minority group targeted by high levels of prejudices from the part of the majority society.

1.2.3. Events of high interest in 2006

In order to better understand the outcome of the given research few special events during the observed year should be pointed out, as these were the ones dominating the public discourse and (possibly) hindering the appearance of the migrants in the media. In the spring of 2006 there have been general elections and in the autumn local governmental elections in Hungary. Accordingly the observed daily paper has closely followed the campaign and the outcome of the elections together with the formation of the new

⁸ 5 – 8% of the society are of Roma origin.

government.⁹ The issue of immigration has not been on the agenda of any of the parties of the electoral campaign; hence this topic has not been discussed by the newspaper when reporting on the events surrounding the elections.

A further episode, the leaking of the so-called Öszöd-speech of the prime minister has triggered a row of sometimes violent street demonstrations from late September on, which have as well been in the focus of the media. As the anti-government and anti-establishment demonstrations have been partly organised by far right groups, the far-right in general is highly represented among the actors of the coded claims. It should be stated, however, that in most of the cases the claims of the far-right actors have been coded automatically, so the majority of the issues raised by these actors have little to do with immigration or any matters concerning minorities. The claims of the far-right have rather targeted the prime minister's position along with other anti-establishment demands or had a revanchist or revisionist focus reflecting the Treaty of Trianon.

There has been one special topic in 2006 that could have raised the interest in the issue of migration, namely the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria on the 1st of January, 2007. There have been ongoing negotiations throughout the year whether or not to open the Hungarian labour market to the citizens of the new member states. This discussion in some cases has touched upon the issue of the migrants who already lived in Hungary, however mostly the future trends have been guessed.

1.2.4. Migrants in the Hungarian media

There have not been many research carried out so far focusing on the media-representation of migrants in Hungary, however in one international comparative research the Hungarian situation has been observed as well. This international joint project has been completed in late 2006 analysing the material of different media-types (television, press, Internet) for the period of one month. In the Hungarian case the materials of two daily and two weekly newspapers, two homepages, a daily television news program and a daily television magazine program were analysed. In this research the 13 officially recognised minorities' (including the Roma minority) representation was as well observed. According to the outcomes of this research migrants practically do not appear in the Hungarian media. As the author concludes: *"If we would not meet migrants and refugees in our everyday lives or hear about them from the scientific discourse and the NGO-s, according to the Hungarian media we would never be able to guess that there are people from China, Turkey, Afghanistan, Nigeria, etc. at all in our country."*¹⁰

1.3. Distribution of claims in time


The 79 claims found in the Népszabadság have been seemingly randomly scattered around the whole year of 2006 with two peaks, March and September both with 11 claims. For the months of February, April, July and December 4 claims or less have been

⁹ It has happened in 2006 for the first time after the transitions that the ruling party was able to win the elections and form a government for the second time in a row.

¹⁰ Ligeti, György: *Bevándorlók és kisebbségek a médiában*, Médiakutató, 2007 autumn. pp: 25.

found, whereas in the other months 5 to 10 claims have been coded. It would be difficult to find any trends in the distribution of claims in time, however the high number of claims in the autumn period are definitely due to the above mentioned political situation, having the riots and protests from September on.

Chart 1. Distribution of claims in time



1. Actors

The analysis of the data is first of all focussing on the actors by whom the claims in the public have been made, so we are able to observe those groups of actors who have the (political) power enabling them to participate in the public discourse. Concerning the groups absent from this discourse we do not know the exact reasons for their nonappearance; it is only possible to make assumptions in this case.

Since all the political claims of the extreme right were automatically coded, it is hardly surprising that racist and extreme right organisations and far-right political parties form a remarkably populous group among the actors. In fact as much as one third (33.3%) of all claims were made by actors that can be found under the label of 'racist and extreme right organisations and groups'. The second biggest category of actors is 'political parties' with 16.7%, but again it can be said that since all the claims made by racist and far-right groups and parties were coded, the far-right parties dominate among the parties with an overwhelming 84.6%. Taken together, the extreme right groups and parties add up to 47.4%, thus nearly the half of all claims has been made by actors of the far-right.

Table 2. Distribution of claims among groups of actors.


	Valid percent of claims
State and party actors	38.5%
governments	2.6%
police and security agencies	2.6%
state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	3.8%
other state executive agencies	12.8%
political parties	16.7%
Civil society actors	53.9%
churches	1.3%
media and journalists	2.6%
professional organisations and groups	2.6%
migrant and minority organisations and groups	2.6%
pro-minority organisations and groups	5.1%
other civil society organisations and groups	6.4%
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	33.3%
unknown actors	7.7%

2.1. State and party actors

It is telling that among the state actors claims concerning migrants and other minorities are mainly made by those in the low-level state agencies. According to this result it can be seen that the topic of migration is rather neglected by most of the actors in the political sphere, at least according to the public of the press. Throughout the year only two claims of the government have been coded, the thematic focus of which has been minority rights and participation in both cases.

The most active group among the state actors have been the ‘other state executive agencies’. With 10 cases all together this category accounts for 12.7% of all the claims, and this makes it the third largest group among the actors. Despite the relatively large size of this subgroup it is hard to analyse it because of the heterogeneity of the actors. Actors coded under ‘other state executive agencies’ range from high levels of centralised state agencies to local minority governments. Due to this diversity, besides about half of the claims in the category concerning ‘immigration, asylum and alien politics’, claims about revanchist or xenophobic themes can be found as well.

Chart 2. State and party actors




State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants have been far less active than what could have been expected. In fact the actors of this category made only three claims throughout the year. The state actors together with the party actors account for the 38.5% of all claims, but this relatively high percentage is largely caused by the dominance of the far-right among the party actors, and by the heterogeneity of the category of ‘other state executive agencies’.

2.2. Civil society actors

In contrast to the dominance of the far-right, it is noticeable that the migrants, the actual objects of this study are scarcely represented in the selected Hungarian newspaper. Migrant and minority organisations and groups and pro-minority organisations and groups together add up only to the 7.7% of the claims with only six cases. The civil society is by definition diverse and can not be simply merged in opposition of the state and party actors. However, it is telling that among the civil society actors the racist and extreme right groups form the largest subgroup with 33.3% of all claims, while the wide spectrum of other civil society actors, ranging from historical churches to pro-minority organisations, accounts for only 20.6% of the claims.

Chart 3. Civil society actors



2.3. Party affiliation of the actors

The party affiliation of the actors could be coded only in case of around one fifth of all claims (21.5%), however, this is a slightly higher proportion than the percentage of the ‘party actors’ (16.7%), since some actors were not coded under the category of ‘parties’ but according to the agencies where they belonged to. The distribution of the party affiliation resembles the observation mentioned above concerning the party actors, namely the majority of extreme-right affiliations. That occurs because of the automatic coding of the extreme right. In fact, there are only two political parties that represent the political centre, both of them with two claims, which makes the political mainstream to seize only 5% of the overall claims. The rest of the actors with a known party affiliation are on the radical ends of the right-left political spectrum, with only one observation on the left.

Table 3. Party affiliation of first actor

Party affiliation of first actor	Frequency	Percent
No known party affiliation	62	78,5
Fidesz (conservative)	2	2,5
Jobbik (far right)	6	7,6
MIÉP-Jobbik (far right)	1	1,3
MIÉP (far right)	5	6,3
MSZP (social democrats)	2	2,5
Munkáspárt (extreme-left)	1	1,3
Total	79	100,0

2.4. Nationality or ethnicity of the migrant or minority actors

The variable 'natmin', which lists the nationality or ethnicity of the migrant or minority actors consists only of the national minority group of the Roma, so one can conclude that claims by migrant actors have not been found at all in the Hungarian sample. This finding could be explained by several different factors, among others one could argue that the issue of immigration is of no public interest, or that the relatively low proportion of migrants in the country leads to their absence of the media. However it would be hard to tell whether or not the migrant actors themselves have made efforts to be represented. As 15.2% of the objects of all coded claims are migrant related, it can be said that either the discursive opportunities of migrants are bleak, or for various reasons the migrants in Hungary are not interested in their public representation. As for the Roma actors, they account for 10.1% of all claims, accordingly they would become the fourth largest among the group of actors, if such a subgroup had been created. Seven out of eight times Roma actors were the ones making the claim when the ethnic focus of the claim was Roma too. Roma actors are surprisingly well represented when the identity of the object of claims is Roma, from all the 12 of those cases 7 claims were made by them. However, this result should not be suggesting that the Hungarian Roma population is an equal member among others in the Hungarian media. In spite of it, these findings were based on only one, though the biggest left-liberal daily newspaper in Hungary, furthermore there have been several anti-Roma manifestations during the observed period of time.


Table 4. Nationality or ethnicity of object of claim by nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actor (numbers of observations)

		Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actor		Total
		No value for	Roma	
Nationality or ethnicity of object of claim	No value for 'obinat'	59	1	60
	Chinese	3	0	3
	Jewish	1	0	1
	Roma	5	7	12
	Romanian	1	0	1
	Romanian, Bulgarian	1	0	1
	Romanian, Ukrainian	1	0	1
Total		71	8	79

2. Forms of action

From the ten possible forms of claims there are only six present in the Hungarian sample. The distribution of the forms of claims further simplifies the picture, since 86.1% of all claims are under two categories, namely under the most frequent 'verbal statement' (60.8%) and 'demonstrative protest' (25.3%). It is striking though that among the remaining categories there are more cases of violent and confrontational protests than other forms of claim-making. The four cases of violent protests account for 5.1% of the claims. The other non-confrontational forms of claim-making include judicial and direct-democratic action.

Chart 4. Summary form of action



Because of the low number of claims the crosstabs of the ‘summary form of action’ by the categories of actors cannot be appropriately analysed, since the number of observations in the cells are very low, zero or only one-two cases in the majority of the cells. Since 60.8% of all claims are verbal statements, it is hardly surprising that for all the actors the most common form of claim-making is verbal statement, moreover, every actor subgroup made at least one verbal statement. The racist and extreme right organisations and groups form an exception because even though they made 7 verbal statements, this group has also 15 claims in the form of demonstrative protests. The racist and extreme right organisations and groups are the ones which have the most types of claim-making, besides the verbal statements and demonstrative protests one example of confrontational protest can be also found, as well as four cases of violent protests. The other relatively populous group of actors, the ‘other state executive agencies’, like most of the actors, is characterised by verbal statements but also used other forms of claim-making, such as judicial action and demonstrative protests. However, this group of actors is so diverse that concerning the low number of cases the results cannot be generalised at all.

3. Issues and positions

As it was demonstrated several times in this study, far-right groups and parties account for a huge amount of claims, so it is hardly surprising that the most common issues of claims are also related to the extreme right. However, it is not only classical far-right themes that characterise the claim-making of the extreme right. In fact, far-right groups and organisations made mostly anti-establishment claims. Moreover, anti-establishment themes are the most frequent issues at 17.7% of all claims, but as it has been pointed out in the introduction, it is largely due to the peculiar internal political events of the autumn of 2006, when a leaked tape containing a speech of the prime minister caused long lasting demonstrations throughout the rest of the year. Although much of the activity of the far-right can be explained by the continuous participation in the anti-government demonstrations, it is noticeable, that the second and third frequent issues are seemingly

also related to the far-right. The second biggest group is xenophobic claims at 10.1%, and at the third place is the issue of nationalist and revanchist claims, at 7.6% of claims.

The ‘focus’ variable, which merges the issues of claims into fewer categories, alters the above discussed observations to some extent. It becomes clearer why the far-right is so overrepresented in the sample, besides the main cause of the methods of coding. The largest category of claims with a huge margin of 22.8% is the ‘extreme right opposition against political opponents’. However, in contrast with the impression based on the classification of the issues of the claims, the merged categories of the ‘focus’ variable show that the second most frequent type of claims is migrant-related. Claims in the thematic field of immigration, asylum and alien politics account for 15.2% of the sample. At the same time, it is also true, that due to the low number of cases, the 15.2% of migrant-related claims equal only 12 cases, none of which was made by migrant actors. If the minority related categories are merged, they add up to a higher proportion than the percentage of the migrant oriented claims. The categories ‘minority integration politics’, ‘minority rights and participation’, ‘discrimination and unequal treatment’, ‘minority social problems’ and ‘racism in institutional contexts’ accounts for 19.1% of claims. However, we believe that the minority cases to some extent can describe the social environment where the group of immigrants have to succeed as well. From that point of view the outlook for migrant and minority groups seems grim, especially since the proportion of racist and xenophobic claims reaches 19% of the sample, which is a higher proportion than those of the migrant or minority related issues. Of course, like the overrepresentation of the far-right, this is due to the fact that all racist and xenophobic claims had to be coded by definition. However, though the consequences of the methodology can explain the high number of racist and extreme right claims, it cannot hide the fact that only 12 migrant-related claims have been coded throughout the year.

Table 5. Thematic focus: verbal and physical combined

Focus	Count	Percent
immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	12	15,2
minority integration general	1	1,3
minority rights and participation	4	5,1
discrimination and unequal treatment	7	8,9
minority social problems	3	3,8
racism in institutional contexts	4	5,1
non-institutional racism, xenophobia and extreme right tendencies	3	3,8
xenophobic claims	8	10,1
homeland politics	1	1,3
other	3	3,8
general, unspecific claims	2	2,5
World War II, Third Reich, etc.	3	3,8
nationalist and revanchist claims	6	7,6
extreme right opposition against political opponents	18	22,8
mainstream political issues	1	1,3
electoral competition: purely tactical claims	2	2,5
repressive measure	1	1,3
Total	79	100,0

The crosstabs of the actors and the issues, or merged categories of issues is very hard to analyse because of the low number of observations in the cells. It is worth using the ‘focus’ variable instead of ‘issue’, since the former has only 17 subgroups in contrast with 30 of the latter. It seems reasonable to point out only the most important observations instead of a systematic listing of the cell distributions, especially since the numbers of cases in the majority of cells are zero. Nevertheless it is worth noting, that the far right organisations and groups made most of their claims about purely internal politics (16 out of 26 cases), and made more revanchist claims than xenophobic ones (5 vs. 3).

Table 6. Means of position of claim towards issue in case of the different groups of actors

Summary first actor	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
governments	,50	2	,707
police and security agencies	,00	2	,000
state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	,00	3	,000
other state executive agencies	,00	10	,667
political parties	-,82	11	,603
churches	-1,00	1	.
media and journalists	1,00	2	,000
professional organisations and groups	,00	2	1,414
migrant and minority organisations and groups	1,00	2	,000
pro-minority organisations and groups	1,00	4	,000
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1,00	25	,000
other civil society organisations and groups	,20	5	1,095
unknown actors	,33	6	1,033
Total	-,31	75	,870

The means of the entire sample is -0.31 on the variable ‘posit’ which seemingly suggests that the coded articles are representing a rather negative opinion climate regarding of the discursive opportunities of migrants. However, the negative values of the position of claims towards issue can by definition mean anti-migrant, xenophobic and extreme right tendencies at the same time. Since the extreme right actors are the largest group of actors, and they automatically were given a negative value on every one of their claims, it is no wonder that the average position towards the issues is slightly negative. Taking into consideration that the extreme right groups and organisations, as it has been discussed above, are mostly characterised by anti establishment claims, the negative stance towards migrants seems even less likely. In fact, most of the actors’ position has a positive or neutral value towards the issues; only the political parties (again, mainly claims made by far-right parties), the churches (only one case) and extreme right organisations and groups have a strong negative value.

It should be underlined that all state agencies had a 0 value on this variable meaning that they have been neutral or technocratic towards their objects when making claims and the government had one positive and one neutral claim towards its minority object.

4. Objects of claims

The identities of the objects of claims is known only at around one third (34.2%) of all claims. The largest group, at 15.2%, consists of the members of ‘ethnic minorities and

groups', where actually only Roma people can be found. The migrant-related groups together also add up to 15.2% of all claims. However, in regard of both the minorities and the migrants, the number of cases are really low, 12 cases for each of the two categories. In detail there are 3 cases of '(im)migrants/re-migrants', 3 cases of 'asylum seekers', one example of 'illegal aliens/immigrants', and 5 cases of 'labour migrants, contract workers'.


The nationality or ethnicity of the objects of the claims is known even less than the identities of the objects. Only 19 times (24.1%) were the nationality or ethnicity coded at all. The identity of the object of claims is more or less evenly divided between migrant background objects and minorities. In regard to the nationality or ethnicity of the object the Roma minority is the only group appearing under the category of 'ethnic or minority group'. In contrast, from the 12 cases, where the identity of the object of claim is classified as one of the subgroups with migrant background, the nationality or ethnicity is known only 6 times. So in half of the cases where the migrants are the objects of the claims it is not specified where the concerned migrants come from (these cases mainly deal with the migrants in general). When specified, the nationality of migrants is either Eastern-European or Chinese. Three cases include labour migrants with Romanian, Ukrainian or Bulgarian origin, in one case Chinese labour migrants were mentioned as well. Furthermore there are two cases where Chinese migrants are concerned, which are coded under the category of immigrants or re-migrants. In addition, there is one example of Jewish ethnicity; in this specific case the members of the Jewish community have been coded under the category of 'specific national or ethnic group'.¹¹ Despite the low number of cases maybe it is not too far fetched to conclude that the actors are more likely to precisely describe the objects of their claims when their claims are made about the Roma, than in the cases of migrants.

As it has been stated before, due to the low number of cases the analysis of the claims in crosstabs is hardly possible. However, it is worth noticing that extreme right organisations and groups made relatively few times claims about ethnic minorities or groups. Indeed, the objects of the claims made by far-right groups are only two times about the Roma, and once about the Jewish minority. Furthermore, there can be no claims found made by extreme right groups, where the identity of the object of claim points to migrants. Political parties, which group is dominated by extremist parties, made only one claim, where the identity of the object of claim is 'labour migrant', and two claims, where the identity is Roma.

The migrant and minority or pro-minority groups made the ethnic identity of the objects of their claims clear only, when they were talking about the Roma minority (4 cases). The most populous group of actors that specified exactly the object of its claims is the 'other state executive agencies'. The actors of this category mention labour migrants 4 times, Roma 2 times, and immigrants in one case. The 'other state executive agencies' was the only actor group that indicated explicitly that the nationalities of the objects of their claims (labour migrants) were Romanian, Bulgarian and Ukrainian. Yet as this group is truly diverse, ranging from ministerial offices to petite local minority governments, it is hard to extrapolate the observations.

¹¹ It should be taken into consideration that there is an ongoing debate in Hungary whether this group should be referred to as an ethnic or as a religious minority.

Table 7. Crosstab of summary first actor by identity of object of claim

Count	Identity of object of claim							Total
Summary first actor 	(im)migrants/re-migrants	asylum seekers	illegal aliens/immigrants	labour migrants, contract workers	ethnic minorities/groups	specific national or ethnic group	not applicable: claim outside the thematic field	
police and security agencies	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
other state executive agencies	1	0	0	4	2	0	0	7
political parties	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	4
media and journalists	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
professional organisations and groups	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
migrant and minority organisations and groups	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
pro-minority organisations and groups	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	3
other civil society organisations and groups	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
unknown actors	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Total	3	3	1	5	12	1	1	26

Since the subgroup of ‘ethnic minorities or groups’ of the ‘objiden’ variable in the case of this study equals the ‘Roma subgroup’ of the ‘objnat’ variable, the same observations can be made of the distributions concerning the claims where the ethnicity of the claims are Roma.


Table 8. Crosstab of summary first actor by nationality or ethnicity of object of claim

Count	Nationality or ethnicity of object of claim							
Summary first actor	Not specified	Chinese	Jewish	Roma	Romanian	Romanian, Bulgarian	Romanian, Ukrainian	Total
governments	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
police and security agencies	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
other state executive agencies	5	0	0	2	1	1	1	10
political parties	10	1	0	2	0	0	0	13
churches	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
media and journalists	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
professional organisations and groups	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
migrant and minority organisations and groups	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
pro-minority organisations and groups	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	4
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	23	0	1	2	0	0	0	26
other civil society organisations and groups	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	5
unknown actors	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	6
Total	59	3	1	12	1	1	1	78

5. Scope variables

The claims that have been coded throughout the research mostly have been made at and target the national or sub-national level. Accordingly the observed topics seem to be discussed at this stage; hence they can be understood as almost purely internal affairs. Taking the claims of the extreme right and all those claims about racism against the Roma minority, this is fully understandable. Though in case of immigration one could be surprised how little this is understood as an international issue.

Chart 5. Scopes of claims by different dimensions



The scope of the actors is known at almost all claims (91.1%). The vast majority of these claims (94.5%) have been made by actors on either the national (76.4%) or the sub-national level (18.1 %).

Only in case of 13 claims was there a specific addressee mentioned, again, most of these were at the national level (9), further 3 claims addressed actors at the sub-national level and one claim had a foreign national addressee. Similarly, there have only been 14 claims where a specific actor or group was criticised. In this case we do not find criticised actors at the supra-national level, 11 claims criticised national and 3 sub-national actors.

The scopes of the issues of the coded claims show a very similar distribution to the above described ones, since in this case as well we can find 53 claims with a national, 18 with a sub-national and 1 claim concerning a supranational and another a bilateral issue. There have been three claims addressing issues both on the national and the sub-national level. Taking those 12 claims where the thematic focus has been migrant-related, 8 have been

made on the national, 3 on the sub-national and only one case has been addressed at the supra-national (bilateral) level.

There are only four cases where the scope of actor is above the national level, therefore it is possible only to show the differences of the distribution of claims between the national and sub-national levels in regard to the scope of the actors. In fact, most of the actor groups are on the national levels. The sub-national level consists of 13 claims of which both pro-minority organisations and groups and police and security agencies have two claims while at the same time the scope of these actor groups are on the national level also two times. The only other actor group which is characterised by sub-national actors is ‘other state executive agencies’, since 4 out of 10 of their claims were made by actors whose scope was sub-national.

The scope of issues is mostly national or sub-national, there are only two claims where the scope of issues were on a higher level. The vast majority of issues were addressing the whole country and accordingly most of the actor groups can be characterised by issues of national scope. Nevertheless there are a few actor groups that made their claims mostly about sub-national issues. Interestingly nearly all of the issues of claims of the actor groups ‘minority or migrant organisations and groups’ and ‘pro-minority organisations’ were sub-national. That seems to suggest that a significant number of discrimination or racial abuse targeted at the Roma were made on a local scale. By all means, regardless of the scope of the claim, the issues of the actor groups ‘minority or migrant organisations and groups’ and ‘pro-minority organisations’ were either ‘discrimination and unequal treatment’ or ‘non-institutional racism, xenophobia and extreme right tendencies’.

Table 9. Crosstab of summary first actor by scope of first actor

Count	Scope of fist actor					Total
Summary first actor	supra- or transnational: European	supra- or transnational: other	bilateral	national	subnational	
governments	0	0	0	2	0	2
police and security agencies	0	0	0	1	1	2
state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	0	0	1	2	0	3
other state executive agencies	0	0	0	6	4	10
political parties	0	0	0	12	1	13
churches	0	0	0	1	0	1
media and journalists	0	0	0	2	0	2
professional organisations and	0	0	0	2	0	2

groups						
migrant and minority organisations and groups	0	0	0	1	1	2
pro-minority organisations and groups	0	0	0	2	2	4
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	1	0	0	21	2	24
other civil society organisations and groups	0	2	0	3	0	5
unknown actors	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	1	2	1	55	13	72

Two other actor groups, which scope of issues is more balanced between the national and sub-national levels, are the ‘other state executive agencies’ and ‘political parties’. The actors of ‘other state executive agencies’ were partly actors on sub-national level, therefore it is not surprising that their issues were also more often concerning sub-national topics. In contrast, political parties, with one exception, were all national while they often made claims about sub-national issues. The scope of issue of the claims made by political parties was in 5 cases sub-national and in 8 cases national. On sub-national level only extreme right parties made claims among the party-actors. However, it is hard to conclude any further pattern from that fact, since the sub-national scope issues of political parties range from homeland politics to the issue of ‘World War II, Third Reich, etc.’ and to ‘electoral competition: purely tactical claims’.

Table 9. Crosstab of summary first actor by scope of issue

Count	scope of issue						Total
summary first actor	"no verbal claim"	supra- or transnational: other	bilateral	national	subnational	national or subnational	
governments	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
police and security agencies	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
other state executive agencies	0	0	0	6	4	0	10
political parties	0	0	0	8	5	0	13

churches	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
media and journalists	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
professional organisations and groups	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
migrant and minority organisations and groups	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
pro-minority organisations and groups	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	2	0	0	20	3	1	26
other civil society organisations and groups	0	0	0	5	0	0	5
unknown actors	1	1	0	2	1	1	6
Total	3	1	1	52	18	3	78

Unfortunately the number of addressees and criticised actors is so low that any further analysis with the subgroups of actors is impossible.

6. Conclusions

The discursive opportunity structure of migrants in Hungary, according to the analysis of the material of the biggest non-tabloid nationwide daily, have been rather bleak in 2006. One could conclude that they were not represented in the media, as they have not made claims themselves nor have they been regularly in the focus of claims made by different national actors. Accordingly the above analysis gives more of a picture of the publicity of other topics concerning minority groups and the extreme right, where the migrant actors themselves or the issues concerning migration would have to find their ways. To understand the reasons of the absence of the migrants both as actors and as the ones in the focus of the claims, further and broader analysis of the Hungarian society and the residing migrants is needed.

The analysis of the coded claims gives a picture of Hungary as a country struggling with the emergence of the far-right which more rarely addresses migrants and other minority groups than the government or the establishment. It is a further outcome that the Roma are referred to in most of the cases concerning minorities in general and they are the minority group which the far-right targets and not the migrants.

CITY: London¹²

Introduction: location in time and place

This report is divided into two sections. We start here with an introduction of collection and analysis of data, as they were carried out for the exam of the British case of London. We refer only very briefly to the method of political claims-making analysis, since this is tackled more extensively in the integrated discursive report that focuses comparatively on all cities of the LOCALMULTIDEM project. Afterwards, in the following section, this report covers the substantive findings from our data on the British case of London, providing readers with a comprehensive overview of main variables of our analysis.

Drawing on the method of ‘political claims analysis’, we have selected the main newspaper in London, namely, *The Guardian*, and have built a dataset that provides key information to evaluate the political discursive context which actors of different type face. Data in this report refer to the year 2004 (and not 2006 as in other national reports): not only were issues for this year already available for coding to the British team, but the decision to code issues from 2004 enabled the British team to avoid problems linked to the new type of discursive climate following the bomb attacks of 2005. It was thought that this sudden change in the British discursive climate would have introduced a problematic bias when comparing with same data for other cities (where there were no comparable dramatic developments after 2005). After data cleaning, we obtained a sample with 301 cases.

As it is explicitly stated in the integrated report, the unit of analysis here is not made of articles, but of individual instances of discursive interventions, including the whole spectrum of claims-making acts related to migration and ethnicity, irrespective of the actors involved. We have thus targeted civil society groups such as employers and trade unions, NGOs, and campaign organisations, but also political parties and state actors, including the courts, legislatures, local and national governments and supranational institutions. Discursive interventions have been included as long as they were relevant intervention for the public space in the city of London, with no preference in terms of different forms: they thus range from protest actions and public demonstrations to legal action and public statements.

Detailed Analysis of the British case

1. Actors and main groups

A starting point for examining the actual contents of the London data-set is to look at the collective actors who made demands or engaged in collective actions in the field. Table One details the share of interventions by collective actors in the field of migrations

¹² This report has been prepared by Manlio Cinalli, research director of the French team of the Localmultidem project.

politics. A large number of different types of actors have been identified, but this first general table is already sufficient to show that the field is especially occupied by the executive and legislative powers (referring to both the national and the sub-national level).¹³

Table 1: Collective Actors' Share in Discursive Interventions

%	Share in All Interventions
Executives	19.3
Legislatives	17.6
Judiciary	7.3
police and security agencies	8.3
state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	3.3
other state executive agencies	3.3
political parties	3.0
unions and employees	2.0
employers organisations and firms	1.0
churches	0.7
media and journalists	4.7
professional organisations and groups	9.6
migrant and minority organisations and groups	6.3
antiracist organisations and groups	2.3
pro-minority organisations and groups	4.7
general solidarity organisations and groups	3.3
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0.3
Unknown actors	3.0
<u>Total</u>	100,0

Table 2 aims to rationalise this plurality of actors so as to simplify and sharpen a series of following analyses of this report. In particular, the more detailed types of actors (as specified in Table One) have been aggregated into main categories.

A first point from Table 2 is the important role of main sites of legislature and political parties (involved within the former). A second point to note from Table 2 is that 'other civil society groups', that is, organisations that are not primarily engaged with issues of migration and ethnicity (but that still entered the field), account for nearly a fifth of public interventions. This is a crucial finding, since one may hold that debate about migrants is strongly controlled amongst specialist organisations and groups of migrants/minorities themselves. In other words, we found an extensive bottom-up intervention in the field, where space is also left open for an important number of civil society actors that are not specifically focused on issues of migration and ethnicity.

¹³ For a detailed analysis of 'scope' and interactions across different levels, see sub-section 6 of this report.

At the same time, the moderate presence in the public debate of migrants and minorities themselves (6.3%), and other actors working on their behalf (7.0%) may well suggest that discourse about migrants and minorities in London is to some extent pacified, at least until 2004.

Table 2: Collective Actors' Share in Political Claims-making by Main Type

%	
State and party actors	62.1
Governments	19.3
Legislatives and political parties	20.6
Judiciary	7.3
State executive agencies	15.0
Civil society actors	34.9
Socioeconomic interest groups	3.0
Migrants and minorities	6.3
Extreme-right and racist actors	0.3
Antiracist and pro-minority groups	7.0
Other civil society groups	18.3
Unknown actors	3.0
Total	100%
N	301

2. Forms of action

An important indicator for the nature of the political discourse over migration and ethnic relations is the type of action form that is used by actors for accessing the public domain. Table 3 shows the action forms used by different types of actors, ranging from the most institutionalised forms of verbal speech acts to violent protests.

Table 3: Action Forms of Interventions over Migration and Ethnic Relations Society Actors

%	State and Executive	Oth. State Institution	Work/Profess Org	Parties	Migrants Minority	NGOs Migr/Min	Racist ER	Oth. Civ. Society	Unkn.
Political Decisions	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Verbal statements	98.3	100.0	94.8	100.0	84.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	77.8
Judicial	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	10.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

action									
Demonstrat. Protests	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Violent Protests	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0 %	100.0 %

An important finding from Table 3 is that actors in the field of migration and ethnicity do not make an extensive recourse to protest forms. Again, the field is overall pacified with almost unanimous recourse to verbal interventions.

3. Addressees

Another important variable which was coded for this report refers to the institutional and organisational addressees on whom political demands are made to do something about an issue in the fields of migration and ethnic relations. Table 4 shows that only 13% ca. of discursive interventions in our sample called upon specific actors as addressees, indicating the exact percentages for all types of different actors. In line with findings from previous tables, political parties and legislatures, alongside with civil society organisations, stand out as the most relevant actors in the field.

Table 4: Addressees within the Field of Migration/Ethnic Relations

%	Share in All Interventions
Executives	41.5
Legislatures	9.8
Judiciary	9.8
police and security agencies	7.3
other state executive agencies	4.9
political parties	2.4
unions and employees	0.0
employers organisations and firms	2.4
churches	0.0
media and journalists	12.2
professional organisations and groups	4.9
other	4.9
Total	100,0

Proportion of claims-making acts with addressee 13.6 %

4. Issues and Positions

Another important aspect of discursive interventions consists in the content of issues that they raise. Table 5 shows the type of issues that were mobilised by discursive

interventions. In particular, this table aggregates the issues into three main aggregates, each of composed of a broader number of more specific issues. A crucial finding from Table 5 is that issues mobilised in the field of migration and ethnicity are strongly focussed on asylum and alien politics (49.8%), or alternatively on the issue of minority integration (38.9%), in contrast to a not too impressive 11.3% for anti-racism and xenophobia.

Table 5: Issues of claims (percentages)

%	
Immigration, asylum, aliens politics	49.8
Residence rights and recognition	1.3
Entry and exit	3.7
Institutional framework and costs	7.0
Other	37.9
Minority integration politics	38.9
Citizenship and political rights	1.0
Social rights	2.7
Religious and cultural rights	5.3
Discrimination and unequal treatment	20.9
Minority social problems	4.7
Other/general integration issues	4.3
Antiracism, xenophobia, and inter-ethnic relations	11.3
Institutional racism	6.6
Non-institutional racism and xenophobia	4.3
Inter-ethnic conflicts	0.3
Total	100%
N	301

As regards the more precise evaluation of actors who access the public space in the different issue fields, the low number of effectives across the numerous cells combining different types of actors with different types of issue does not allow for a systematic analysis of information. In general terms, and in line with previous findings from other tables, political parties and the legislatures prevail in a large number of issues.

The picture becomes clearer when we look at the stances taken by actors on migrants and minorities. In this case, we have coded each discursive intervention with a score of -1, 0, +1, dependent upon whether if realised the political demand could be seen to be beneficial (+1) or harmful (-1) to the interests of migrants and/or minorities. A score of zero was given for cases of neutral positions, or where the expressed political demand was not clearly beneficial or detrimental to the interests of migrants and/or minorities. When an average score for each collective actor is calculated, then we arrive at a figure between -1 and +1 for the aggregate position of discursive interventions of that actor vis-à-vis the interest of migrants and/or minorities. The first column in Table Six shows the average position scores for each type of actors.

Table 6: Average discursive positions (means)

State and party actors	.26 (187)
Governments	.29 (58)
Legislatures and political parties	.03 (62)
Judiciary	.55 (22)
State executive agencies	.40 (45)
Civil society actors	.42 (105)
Socio-economic interest groups	.11 (9)
Migrants and minorities	.63 (19)
Extreme-right and racist actors	-1.00 (1)
Antiracist and pro-minority groups	.81 (21)
Other civil society groups	.27 (55)
Unknown actors (and private individuals)	.11 (9)
Overall average	.31 (301)

Note: N between parentheses.

It is hardly surprising that the strongest position against the interests of migrants and minorities is taken by racist organisations and groups of the extreme right. A crucial finding from Table 6, however, is that political parties and legislatures' members intervene more often than any other actor (62 claims), taking up the less positive position in the field (+0.03) after racist groups and the extreme right. At the other pole of the discursive field pro-beneficiaries (+0.81) and organisations of migrants and minorities themselves (+0.63) make the case for migrants/minorities. It is also worth noting that the position of the extreme right is a discursive gulf away from averages of any other actor. This indicates that there are also more likely to be links and coalitions between actors on the pro-migrants/minorities side of the debate, whereas the extreme right takes up a more isolated position in the public space.

5. Interactions across different levels

A final focus of investigation of this project is to examine the extent to which interventions over migration and ethnicity in London are articulated across the national and sub-national levels. For example, one indicator for the 'nationalisation' of the political debates about migration and ethnicity would be finding especially evidence of national actors as prominent claims-makers, perhaps linking national to local issues, and hence, bridging the gap between national and sub-national public spheres. The analysis here focuses on 1) actors who access the public space and 2) the issue that they raise. Table 7 shows the geographical scope of the claims-making actors who appeared in the British sample.

Table 7: Scope of actors of claims by city (percentages)

	London
European	4.0
Other supranational	2.0
Foreign-based/bilateral	1.0
National or subnational	92.9
Total	100%
N	297

In particular, Table 7 shows that over 90% of the actors who make political demands are national or sub-national. This is an evidence of the limited trans-nationalisation of the field of politics over migration and ethnicity. This result is also evident in Table 8. In this case, the combination of national and sub-national scope is just under the 90% threshold.

Table 8: Scope of issues of claims (percentages)

	London
European	6.6
Other supranational	0.3
International relations	3.3
National or subnational	89.7
Total	100%
N	301

Introduction: location in time and place

This report is divided into three sections. We start here with an introduction of collection and analysis of data, as they were carried out for the exam of the French case of Lyon. We refer only very briefly to the method of political claims-making analysis, since this is tackled more extensively in the integrated discursive report that focuses comparatively on all city cases of the LOCALMULTIDEM project. Afterwards, in the following section, this report covers the substantive findings from our data on the French case of Lyon, providing readers with a comprehensive overview of main variables of our analysis. Lastly, a section of conclusions highlights the main findings for Lyon.

Drawing on the method of ‘political claims analysis’, we have selected the main newspaper in Lyon, namely, *Le Progrès*, and have built a dataset which provides key information to evaluate the political discursive context which actors of different type face. In a two-way process, actors also contribute to shape their own discursive context when entering the public space with their own interventions. In contrast to many media content analyses, we are not primarily interested in the way in which the media frame events. Rather, our focus has been on the news coverage of different forms of discursive interventions, both verbal and non-verbal, in the public space by non-media actors.

It is important to emphasise that our units of analysis are not articles, but individual instances of discursive interventions, including the whole spectrum of claims-making acts related to migration and ethnicity, irrespective of the actors involved. We have thus targeted civil society groups such as employers and trade unions, NGOs, and campaign organisations, but also political parties and state actors, including the courts, legislatures, local and national governments and supranational institutions. Discursive interventions have been included as long as they were relevant intervention the *Lyonnaise* public space, with no preference in terms of different forms: they thus range from protest actions and public demonstrations to legal action and public statements.

A few extra lines to support our decision to use *Le Progrès*. This paper was chosen because it is compatible with the selection in other cities of other countries of the LOCALMULTIDEM project, and because, compared to other local quality newspapers in Lyon, it has an encompassing coverage of the specific issues of interest. Overall, the French data on political claims-making were collected from every second edition of *Le Progrès* (Monday, Wednesday and Friday) covering the entire year 2006. After data cleaning, we obtained a sample with 495 cases, including all interventions referring explicitly to migration, minorities, integration of non-autochthonous and related issues. That is, our sample of discursive interventions is not directly compatible with a single policy field but include all interventions affecting the interests of migrants and their descendents.

¹⁴ This report has been produced by Manlio Cinalli, research director of the French Localmultidem team.

1. Actors and main groups

A starting point for examining the actual contents of the French data-set is to look at the collective actors who made demands or engaged in collective actions in the field. Table 1 details the share of interventions by collective actors in the field of migrations politics. A large number of different types of actors have been identified, but this first general table is already sufficient to show that the field is especially occupied by the executive power (here referring to both the national and the sub-national level)¹⁵ alongside with organisations of migrants and minorities themselves. If we also consider those interventions that are generated by other organisations acting on behalf of migrants/minorities, we can target over half of overall interventions.

Table 1: Collective Actors' Share in Discursive Interventions

%	Share in All Interventions
Executives	21,4
Legislatives	5,5
Judiciary	5,7
police and security agencies	4,4
state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	,2
other state executive agencies	1,6
political parties	7,3
unions and employees	1,2
employers organisations and firms	2,4
churches	,8
media and journalists	,2
professional organisations and groups	3,8
migrant and minority organisations and groups	16,4
antiracist organisations and groups	2,6
pro-minority organisations and groups	12,5
general solidarity organisations and groups	1,6
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	6,1
other civil society organisations and groups	3,4
Unknown actors	2,8
<u>Total</u>	100,0

Table 2 aims to rationalise this plurality of actors so as to simplify and sharpen a series of following analyses of this report. In particular, the more detailed types of actors (as specified in Table One) have been aggregated into eight categories: state and executive; political parties;¹⁶ work and professional organisations; churches; non-governmental

¹⁵ For a detailed analysis of 'scope' and interactions across different levels, see sub-section 6 of this report.

¹⁶ Political Parties include only claims-making acts by political party organisations or representatives thereof; thus members of government would be included in state and executive actors not political parties.

organisations acting specifically on behalf of migrants and/or minorities; the constituency of the migrants/minorities acting for themselves; racist and extreme-right actors; and finally, other civil society actors.

A first point from Table 2 is the prominence of state and executive actors, both at the national or at the sub-national level, who make well over a third of public interventions (38.8%) in the overall field. As we saw in Table 1, more than a fifth of all claims were made by executive actors (21.4%): this shows that central and local governments are by far the most dominant actor in debates about migration and ethnicity in Lyon.

A second point to note from Table 2 is that work and professional organisations (7.6%) and churches (0.8%) together account for much less than a tenth of public interventions. This is somewhat surprising, since it is commonly held that debate about migrants is strongly linked to economic interests, or alternatively to most fundamental duties of aid and solidarity.

At the same time, the substantial presence in the public debate of migrants and minorities themselves (16.4%), and other actors working on their behalf (15.1%) suggests that discourse about migrants and minorities in France have not been pacified, or better, that migrants and minorities are strong enough to mobilise sufficient resources to access the public domain. That is, migrants and minorities do not appear as mere ‘objects’ of the discourse about their condition: in fact, they are significant ‘protagonists’.

Table 2: Collective Actors’ Share in Political Claims-making

%	Share in All Interventions
State and Executive	38.8
Political Party	7.3
Work (employers/employees) and professional organisations	7.7
Churches	0.8
Migrants and Minorities	16.4
NGOs pro- Migrants and pro- Minorities	15.2
Racist and Extreme Right Actors	6.1
Other Civil Society	5.1
Unknown Actors	2.8
All Actors	100.0
N	495

Another variable of our codebook allows for controlling party political affiliation of all actors with a party affiliation.

There is also a 5% of interventions by more general civil society actors: this presence implies an extensive bottom-up intervention in the field, where space is also left open for an important number of civil society actors that are not specifically focused on issues of migration and ethnicity. Again, the field seems far from being pacified, with some extensive intervention (6.1%) by racist groups and the extreme right. Thus it appears that state actors definitively shape the public discourse on immigration and ethnic integration, and that actors in civil society, whether they act on behalf or against migrants and minorities, mobilise accordingly to advance as they can their own position.

The picture about actors is completed only once we analyse the data about the nationality and the ethnicity of actors. In line with a strong “Republican” conception of ethnicity and integration, only 9.5% of all interventions include an explicit acknowledgement of an ethnic, or otherwise ‘national’ affiliation. It is sufficient to say that this trend is confirmed even when focus is exclusively put on interventions by migrants and minorities themselves. In this case, nearly 60% of interventions have no reference to any ethnic or national group. Following this same trend, pro-migrants actors never refer to any national or ethnic affiliation whenever they access the public space with their interventions. Put simply, French Republicanism seems far from being weakened in the overall public discourse.

2. Forms of action

An important indicator for the nature of the political discourse over migration and ethnic relations is the type of action form that is used by actors for accessing the public domain. Table Three shows the action forms used by different types of actors, ranging from the most institutionalised forms of verbal speech acts and conventional action forms, such as making public verbal statements, through to demonstrative protests, and then confrontational and violent protests.

Table 3: Action Forms of Interventions over Migration and Ethnic Relations Society Actors

%	State and Executive	Polit. Party	Work/Professional Organisations	Church	Migrants Minority	NGOs Migr/Min	Racist ER	Oth. Civ. Society	Unknown
Repressive Measure	18.2%	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Political Decisions	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	0.0%	0.0%	7.2%
Verbal statements	58.3%	94.4%	86.9%	100%	85.2%	54.7%	90.0%	58.3%	71.4%
Judicial action	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.7%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%

Direct dem. Action	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%
Petitioning	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.0%	0.0%	12.5%	7.2%
Demonstrat. Protests	0.0%	5.6%	7.9%	0.0%	7.4%	29.3%	0.0%	20.8%	7.1%
Confrontat. Protests	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Violent Protests	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%	100.0%
N	193	36	38	4	81	75	30	24	14

An important finding from Table 3 is that organisations of migrants and minorities, and other groups mobilising on their behalf, make an extensive recourse to protest forms, though there is little confrontation and no violence at all. Indeed, racist and extreme-right organisations are the only actors who make recourse to violent protests. The field of migration and ethnic relations seems to be generally mediated through institutionalised mechanisms and is overall pacified with major recourse to verbal interventions or, at the most, to conventional forms of action such as organisation of public meetings and petitioning.

3. Addressees and criticised actors

Another important variable which was coded for this report refers 1) to the institutional and organisational addressees on whom political demands are made to do something about an issue in the fields of migration and ethnic relations, and 2) to the institutional and organisational objects of an explicit criticism. Table 4 shows that just over one third of discursive interventions in our sample (33.9%) called upon specific actors as addressees, indicating the exact percentages for all types of different actors. In line with findings from previous tables, the executive, alongside with the organisations of migrants and minorities themselves, stand out as the most relevant actors in the field. Perhaps, compared to data of tables 1 and 2, the most surprising input of table 4 refers to the minor role that pro-beneficiaries play as explicit addresses in the field.

Table 4: Addressees within the Field of Migration/Ethnic Relations

%	Share in All Interventions
Executives	15,2
Legislatives	3,2
Judiciary	4,0
police and security agencies	,2
state executive agencies	,6

political parties	1,4
unions and employees	,2
employers organisations and firms	,6
churches	,4
professional organisations and groups	1,2
migrant and minority organisations and groups	5,7
pro-minority organisations and groups	,2
general solidarity organisations and groups	,4
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	,4
other civil society organisations and groups	,2
Interventions without an addressee	66,1
<u>Total</u>	100,0

Proportion of claims-making acts with addressee 33.9%

Findings are not too different when the attention is focused on explicit objects of criticism within the overall field. In this case, the most interesting finding refers to those “culprits” that are singled out in the debate as being the major cause for problems, negative consequences, etc. Table 5 shows that just over 37% of discursive interventions in our sample called upon specific criticised actors. Following the trend of Table 4, the executive is still the most relevant target of criticism in the field. However, a major difference between Table 4 and Table 5 regards the role of migrants and minorities themselves, which are only rarely singled out as a source of concern or as a cause of negative consequences. In addition, Table 5 reports a high figure for the extreme right, which emerges as the most criticised actor after the executive.

Table 5: Criticised Actors within the Field of Migration/Ethnic Relations

%	<u>Share in All Interventions</u>
Executives	20,0
Legislatives	,4
Judiciary	,6
police and security agencies	1,2
state executive agencies	1,4
political parties	3,4
media and journalists	,8
employers organisations and firms	1,4
churches	,4
professional organisations and groups	,2
migrant and minority organisations and groups	3,0
pro-minority organisations and groups	,4
general solidarity organisations and groups	,2
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	4,2
Interventions without an addressee	62,2
<u>Total</u>	100,0

Proportion of claims-making acts with a criticised actor 37.8%

4. Issues and Positions

Another important aspect of discursive interventions consists in the content of issues which they raise. Table 6 shows the type of issues that were mobilised by discursive interventions. In particular, this table aggregates the issues into sixteen thematic focuses where ‘verbal’ and ‘physical’ are combined. A crucial finding from Table 6 is that issues mobilised in the field of migration and ethnicity are strongly focussed on asylum and alien politics (38.8%), or alternatively on the issue of extreme right tendencies (15.4%), in contrast to a not too impressive 14% for minority rights, and indeed a tiny 1% about issues relating to inter-ethnic relations. Hence, the public space in Lyon confirms the prevalence of a type discourse focussed more on migrants and racism than on minorities and explicit concern about their own positions as ‘groups’ themselves.

Table 6: Issues in Migration and Ethnic Relations

%	Share in All Interventions
immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	38,0
minority integration general	2,8
minority rights and participation	14,1
discrimination and unequal treatment	4,0
minority social problems	2,4
interethnic, inter- and intraorganisational relations	1,0
racism in institutional contexts	4,2
non-institutional racism, and extreme right tendencies	15,4
xenophobic claims	,6
homeland politics	3,4
other	2,0
World War II, Third Reich, etc.	1,4
extreme right opposition against political opponents	,8
mainstream political issues	,6
electoral competition: purely tactical claims	1,6
repressive measure	7,5
Total	100,0 (N495)

As regards the more precise evaluation of actors who access the public space in the different issue fields, the low number of effectives across the numerous cells combining different types of actors with different types of issue does not allow for a systematic analysis of information. In general terms, and in line with previous findings from other tables, institutional actors, and in particular the executive, prevail in a large number of issues. Yet, there are important exceptions to this trend, with other types of actors playing the role of major protagonist in specific issue fields. Thus, in the case of debates about ‘access to welfare services’ and ‘expulsion and deportations’, the intervention of pro-beneficiaries is stronger than that of institutional actors. Not surprisingly, work and

professional organisations dominate the debate whenever interventions refer to ‘social rights and participation’ and ‘discrimination in the labour market’. Another finding that will not strike the reader is that organisations of migrants and minorities themselves are protagonists in debates concerning ‘religion’ and ‘homeland politics’. Yet, it should also be noticed that no more than a third of all interventions by migrants and minorities refer to these two specific issue fields combined together. Lastly, when we turn to issues about ‘housing and segregation’ and ‘political rights’, general civil society organisations dominate the debate.

The picture becomes clearer when we look at the stances taken by actors on migrants and minorities. In this case, we have coded each discursive intervention with a score of -1, 0, +1, dependent upon whether if realised the political demand could be seen to be beneficial (+1) or harmful (-1) to the interests of migrants and/or minorities. A score of zero was given for cases of neutral positions, or where the expressed political demand was not clearly beneficial or detrimental to the interests of migrants and/or minorities. When an average score for each collective actor is calculated, then we arrive at a figure between -1 and +1 for the aggregate position of discursive interventions of that actor vis-à-vis the interest of migrants and/or minorities. The first column in Table 7 shows the average position scores for each type of actors. Actors have been arranged in order running top-to-bottom from -1 (against to the interests of the constituency) to +1 (in favour of the interests of the constituency). This gives a first qualitative indicator for the positions of collective actors relative to one another in the field of migration and ethnic relations.

Table 7: Collective Actors’ Average Position on Migrants and Minorities

%	Average Position in All Claims (-1 to +1)
Racist and Extreme Right Actors	-0.87
State and Executive	+0.10
Political Party	+0.23
Work (employers/employees) and professional organisations	+0.65
Churches	+0.75
Other Civil Society	+0.80
Migrants and Minorities	+0.88
NGOs for Migrants and Minorities	+0.97
Unknown Actors	+0.86

A point which is not surprising from Table 7 is that the actors who take up the strongest position against the interests of migrants and minorities are racist organisations and groups of the extreme right companies (-0.87). At the other pole of the discursive field pro-beneficiaries (+0.97) and organisations of migrants and minorities themselves

(+0.88) make the case for migrants/minorities. These figures are even more noticeable once we consider that Tables 1 and 2 show that migrants and minorities, together with organisations mobilising on their behalf, make a third of overall interventions, thus marking their strong presence in the public domain. It is also worth noting that the position of the extreme right is a discursive gulf away from averages of any other actor, and that state and executive actors (+0.10), political parties (+0.23), and other civil society actors (+0.80), take up a position that is supportive to the interests of migrants and minorities. This indicates that there are also more likely to be links and coalitions between actors on the pro-migrants/minorities side of the debate, whereas the extreme right takes up a more isolated position in the public space.

5. Objects and Main Ethnic Groups

The analysis of actors that are the objects of interventions and their own ethnic characterisations provides results that are consistent with previous finding about actors that make the interventions and their own ethnic characterisations. Thus, Table 8 shows that debate often revolves around the identification of a ‘status’, for example in the case of *sans-papiers* (26.9%) or ‘immigrants’ (6.9%), leaving only ca. 50% of interventions more specifically focused on ethnic, national or religious labels. In fact, even within this half of the public space, ‘cultural groups’ are often left as indistinct, being referred to general ‘minorities’, ‘religious groups’, etc. Indeed, a specific nationality, religion, or ethnicity of the object of is appealed to in less than 20% of overall interventions.

Table 8: Objects in the Field of Migration and Ethnic Relations

%	Share in All Interventions
extreme right parties	1.2
other concrete xenophobic or extreme right organizations	1.6
the extreme right, racists, xenophobes unspecified	4.0
foreigners/aliens	3.2
minorities	0.4
(im)migrants/re-migrants	6.1
allochthonen	0.2
asylum seekers	4.0
illegal aliens/immigrants, sans papiers,	26.9
labour migrants, contract workers, saisonniers	0.4
ex-patriats	0.8
racial minorities/groups	1.6
black	0.8
religious minorities/groups	0.6
muslim/islamic	11.5
hindu	0.2
jewish	2.8
sikh	0.4

ethnic minorities/groups	2.2
specific national or ethnic group	2.6
specific hyphenated national or ethnic group	0.2
migrants and minorities unspecified	1.0
not applicable: repressive measure	6.7
not applicable: claim outside the thematic field	20.4
Total	100.0

In addition to this, another interesting finding is that ethnic characterisation is not preponderant even when focusing exclusively on interventions by migrants and minorities themselves (43%). Yet, in this latter case, emphasis should be put on the fact that Muslim identity is the most used (29.6%) followed at some great distance by the Jew identity (7.4%).

6. Interactions across different levels

Another focus of investigation of this project is to examine the extent to which interventions over migration and ethnicity in Lyon are articulated across the national and sub-national levels. For example, one indicator for the ‘nationalisation’ of the political debates about migration and ethnicity would be finding especially evidence of national actors as prominent claims-makers in Lyon, perhaps linking national to local issues, and hence, bridging the gap between national and sub-national public spheres. Of course, further analysis can also take in consideration the addressees and the criticised actors, so as to check instances where national or sub-national actors target a national or sub-national actors while referring to a national or sub-national object. Yet, given the low number of effectives (see Tables 4 and 5), the analysis here focuses on 1) actors who access the public space and 2) the issue which they raise. Table 9 shows the geographical scope of the claims-making actors who appeared in the French sample.

Table 9: Scope of Actors Making the Interventions

%	Share in All Interventions
Supra- or Trans-National	0.8
Foreign National	0.0
Migrant Homelands	0.2
National	39.2
Sub-National	58.4
National or Sub-National	1.4
Total	100.0

In particular, Table 9 shows that nearly 60% of the actors who make political demands are sub-national, with a further 40% of national actors. This is an evidence of the key weight which the national level plays in the local public space of Lyon, together with a limited trans-nationalisation of the field of politics over migration and ethnicity. This

result is also evident in Table 10. In this case, focusing on the issues that are raised, the national scope (54.3%) is strongly prevalent on the sub-national scope (32.7%).

Table 10: Scope of the Issues

%	Share in All Interventions
No verbal Claim	7.1
Supra- or Trans-National	2.4
Foreign National	2.0
Migrant Homelands	1.2
National	54.3
Sub-National	32.7
National or Sub-National	0.2
Total	100.0

At the same time, it is important to emphasise that national actors intervenes especially on national issues. Indeed there were only two single instances where a national actor intervened on an issue that was specific to the debate in Lyon. Put simply, our data also reflect an important part of the public debate that is filtered down from the national discourse to the sub-national level through the reports of *Le Progrès*. This is different from findings relative to sub-national actors. In this case, over half of their interventions refer to an issue with sub-national scope, while a third of their interventions is still targeting directly the national level.

Summary of main findings for the French case

This report has shown a number of central points in terms of discursive interventions in the case of the city of Lyon. In general terms, we can say migrants and minorities do not appear as simple ‘objects’ of the discourse about their condition. This is particularly true when one takes into consideration also the active role of pro-beneficiary organisations mobilising on behalf of migrants and/or minorities. However, state and executive actors dominate the debates about migration and ethnicity, whereas other civil society organisations such as work and professional organisations or general NGOs seem to play only a limited role. Put simply, the field of migration and ethnic relations appears as a potential host of forms of contentious politics, dominated by state actors vis-à-vis the organisations of migrants and minorities.

On the one hand, central and local governments are by far the most dominant actor in debates about migration and ethnicity in Lyon. On the other hand, migrants and minorities are still significant ‘protagonists’. State actors shape the public discourse on immigration and ethnic integration, but they have to face a constant bottom-up pressure. Nevertheless, this potential does not translate necessarily into strong mobilisations: we found little evidence for extensive protests over migration and ethnicity. There is some

important recourse to demonstrative forms of action, particularly by pro-migrants. And yet, even the latter engages first of all in verbal statements. The field of migration and ethnic relations seems to be generally mediated through institutionalised mechanisms and is overall pacified with major recourse to verbal interventions or to conventional forms of action such as organisation of public meetings and petitioning.

Other findings fit with the debate on French collocation between traditional Republicanism and more recent multicultural developments. While issue fields such as 'religion' and 'homeland politics' are more marginal in the French debate, we found that organisations of migrants and minorities themselves are key protagonists in these debates. While 'cultural' characterisations are not common within the public space, Muslim and Jew identities have a preponderant position whenever religion and ethnicity are invoked in the interventions.

It is also worth noting that the position of the extreme right is far from other actors, and that state and executive actors, political parties, and other civil society actors, take up a position that is overall supportive to the interests of migrants and minorities. This indicates that there are also more likely to be links and coalitions between actors on the pro-migrants/minorities side of the debate, whereas the extreme right takes up a more isolated position in the public space.

Finally, we could not find any evidence for trans-nationalisation or supra-nationalisation of the public debates over migration and ethnicity, either by an important presence of trans-national or supra-national actors, or in more issues with a trans-national or supra-national scope reference, or by trans-national and supra-national actors being called upon to politically respond to interventions. In short, the public space in Lyon is put under the extra weight of the national level, with only some very limited evidence for trans-nationalisation in the field of migration and ethnic relations.

CITY: Madrid¹⁷

1. INTRODUCTION

The data collection for this component of the project was, in the case of Madrid, undertaken with the systematic analysis of the Madrid edition of the nation-wide paper *El País* for the whole year of 2006. In our case, there was no high-quality local newspaper that could have adequately been chosen as an alternative. According to data from the OJD (*Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión*), *El País* is the nation-wide newspaper with a largest dissemination and hence was the best choice for the data collection envisaged.¹⁸

The sampling and coding instructions common to all the Localmultidem teams were followed with just one exception. Unlike for other cities/countries, in Spain Sunday editions are always published and, hence, Monday editions typically do not cover events that have taken place Saturday. Yet, many claims-making often take place during weekends and very often Saturdays, especially protest events, and having left out Sunday editions would have resulted in a likely bias in terms of the distribution of the types of claims-making. For this reason, the data collection for Madrid added Sunday editions to the sample – in agreement with the WP coordinators.

In terms of the political biases of the selected newspaper, it is generally acknowledged that *El País* is a newspaper with a centre-left leaning editorial line, with liberal political views usually close to the Socialist party (PSOE) position, though the degree to which they will back the Socialist government (the PSOE has been in government since March 2004) varies depending on the specific issue and period.

Turning to the analysis of the results obtained, for the full year of 2006 we have retrieved 524 instances of claims-making, of which 90 (17%) were located in Sunday editions. Figure 1 shows an interesting cycle of claims-making that gradually increases from the start of the year to peak during the Summer months of August and September only to return back to their January levels at the end of the year (December 2006).

Further to this, an examination of the geographical scope or location of the claims made indicates that the vast majority (89%) of these happen in Spanish territory, of which most refer to national instances of claims-making that cannot be linked to any specific locality or region. Interestingly enough only 14% are specifically related to Madrid (city and region), which is not much higher than those we find related to the Canary Islands

¹⁷ This report has been produced by Elisa Rodríguez, research associate of the Spanish team of the Localmultidem project, and Laura Morales, the team director of the Spanish Localmultidem team, and coordinator of the whole consortium.

¹⁸ See the report by the OJD at:
http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/200705/25/sociedad/20070525elpepusoc_3.Pes.PDF.pdf

(13.5%) and Barcelona or Catalonia (around 9%), despite the use of the Madrid local edition of the newspaper.

These results – both the time cycle and the geographical bounding – is reflecting the nature of many of the claims that have dominated the news coverage related to immigration and immigrants in 2006 in Spain: the negotiation of the Catalan Estatute of Autonomy, the crisis of massive arrivals to Spanish coasts of irregular migrants, and the announcement by the Spanish government of several pieces of new legislation related to immigrants and immigration (among which the possibility of granting non-national voting rights for local elections).

Figure 1. Time location of the claims




Table 1. Place location of the claims

Place of claim	%	n
Spain	41.4	217
Madrid	13.9	73
Barcelona	1.7	9
Ceuta and Melilla	2.3	12
Other Spanish local place	6.7	35
Andalusia	1.3	7
Canary Islands	13.5	71
Catalonia	7.1	37
other Spanish Region	1.0	5
Brussels	5.3	28
European country	1.9	10

Africa	2.5	13
other foreign countries	1.4	7
Total	100	524

2. ACTORS

The distribution of claims by types of actors in Madrid reflects a clear dominance of institutional – state and party – actors in the public discourse and debate around immigration, at least as portrayed by the press (Table 2). And, in particular, governments and political parties get the lion share of all the forms of claims-making in the public arena (61% of all), leaving other institutions and branches of Government (Legislative and Judiciary) with only a symbolic presence in public interventions regarding immigration.

Civil society actors are not particularly vocal in this regard, and we see a relatively even spread among different types of civil society actors, with migrant organisations only marginally more vocal than unions or pro-minority organisations. Racist and extreme right organisations and groups are quite marginal in public interventions, something that matches accumulated knowledge on their small following and institutional representation when compared to other European countries.

Table 2. Type of actor

Type of actor	%	n
<i>State and party actors</i>	75.2	394
Executive Governments	42.7	224
Political parties	18.5	97
Police and security agencies	4.8	25
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	3.6	19
Legislatives	3.2	17
Other state executive agencies	1.3	7
Judiciary	1.0	5
<i>Civil society actors</i>	24.0	126
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	5.3	28
Unions and employees	3.6	19
Pro-minority organisations and groups	3.4	18
Professional organisations and groups	3.4	18
Other civil society organisations and groups	2.7	14

Antiracist organisations and groups	2.1	11
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	1.3	7
Churches	1.0	5
General solidarity organisations and groups	0.6	3
Employers organisations and firms	0.4	2
Radical left organisations and groups	0.2	1
<i>Other actors</i>	0.8	4
Unknown actors	0.2	1
Missing	0.6	3
Total	100	524

In this regard, given the dominance of the Executives and the political parties in immigration-related claims-making in our case, it is particularly important to analyse the partisan affiliation of these actors (Table 3). As we could expect, in this regard the larger share of the interventions (around a third) come from Socialist actors (the governing PSOE or its Catalan affiliate PSC). With opposition parties (PP, IU, CiU) or regional governing parties (CC) with a much smaller presence in public interventions.

Table 3. Party of the actor

Party of actor	%	N
PSOE (Spanish Socialists)	31.1	163
PP (centre-right)	11.6	61
CC (Canary Islands Regional Party)	6.5	34
IU (Left)	3.2	17
CiU (Catalan Nationalist Party)	1.7	9
PSC (Catalan Socialists, linked to PSOE)	1.7	9
Other Spanish parties	1.9	10
Several Spanish parties, mixed ideological leanings	0.4	2
Other foreign parties	3.2	17
Not applicable: no partisan actor	38.5	202
Total	100	524

In the few instances where the actor was of foreign origin (less than 10%), there is no evidence of any particular accumulation of any single nationality in the public arena (Table 4). Senegalese-origin actors seem to be more visible in this particular year, but this is likely to be time-specific and related to the crisis of massive inflows of immigrants arriving by boat frequently from Senegal's shores. It is interesting to note that, in spite of their larger share of the immigrant population, Latin American actors are not particularly vocal in the public sphere.

Table 4. Nationality of the actor

Nationality of actor	%	n
Not applicable: no minority or migrant actor	90.6	475
Senegalese	2.7	14
Muslim	1.9	10
Latin American	0.9	5
Romanian	0.8	4
Pakistani	0.6	3
Mauritanian	0.6	3
Jewish	0.4	2
Other European	0.6	3
Other non European	1.2	6
Total	100	524

3. FORMS OF INTERVENTION

When we turn our attention to the forms of intervention that the instances of claims-making take (Table 5), we find an overwhelming dominance of verbal statements, with political decisions taking a distant second place, and with all forms of protest being relatively marginal (only around 3% when all are aggregated). This reflects a relatively ‘pacified’ issue and policy-making domain, where ‘talking’ rather than ‘acting’ seems to dominate the scene for all types of actors (see Table 6), with the only logical exception of racist and extreme right groups. In this regard, it is interesting to note that verbal statements are the dominant form of intervention even by actors that would logically be expected to intervene more often with political decisions (eg. Executives and Legislatives) or with other forms of non-verbal action (eg. Judiciaries and the Police). Protest is restricted to civil society actors but, even for these, verbal statements dominate the scene; and migrant organisations rarely take on to the streets.

Table 5. Forms of intervention

	%	N
Verbal statements	84.5	443
Political decision	8.8	46
Demonstrative protests	1.7	9
Meetings	1.5	8
Violent protests	1.3	7
Repressive measure	1.1	6
Judicial action	0.8	4
Confrontational protests	0.2	1
Total	100	524

Table 6. Forms of intervention by type of actor

Actor	Form of intervention								Total
	Repressive measure	Political decision	Verbal statements	Meetings	Judicial action	Demonstr. protests	Confront. protests	Violent protests	
Executive Governments	0	14.7	83	2.2	0	0	0	0	224
Legislatives	0	35.3	64.7	0	0	0	0	0	17
Judiciary	20	0	60	0	20	0	0	0	5
Police and security agencies	20	20	56	0	4	0	0	0	25
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	19
Other state executive agencies	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	7
Political parties	0	1	97.9	0	1	0	0	0	97
Unions and employees	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	19
Employers organisations and firms	0	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	2
Churches	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	5
Professional organisations and groups	0	0	94.4	5.6	0	0	0	0	18
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	0	0	89.3	0	0	10.7	0	0	28
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	11
Pro-minority organisations and groups	0	0	83.3	0	5.6	5.6	5.6	0	18
General solidarity organisations and groups	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	3
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	0	14.3	14.3	0	0	0	71.4	7

Actor	Form of intervention								Total
	Repressive measure	Political decision	Verbal statements	Meetings	Judicial action	Demonstr. protests	Confront. protests	Violent protests	
Radical left organisations and groups	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	0	57.1	7.1	0	28.6	0	7.1	14
Total	1.1	8.8	84.5	1.5	0.8	1.7	0.2	1.3	524

4. ADDRESSEES AND CRITICIZED ACTORS

Having described the actors responsible for the claims and their forms of intervention, we turn our attention to the addressees of the claims. In the case we are studying (Madrid/Spain), very often the interventions have no specific addressee (59% of them), but when they do, these are most often directed to Executive branches of Government (Table 7). This reflects the dominance of Executives in Spanish policy-making, as legislative branches are generally regarded as weak and the judiciary has a very limited role of revision of policy-making beyond the Constitutional Court. Consequently, it is not very surprising that claims will most often target Executives. For the same reason, Executives are the most likely targets of public criticism in claims-making events, but in most instances we cannot even identify a criticised actor (Table 8). This would indicate that at this stage of the evolution of claims-making in the domain of immigration, the level of contestation and confrontation is relatively limited.

Table 7. Addressee of the claim

Addressee of the claim	%	N
Executive Governments	27.7	145
Legislatives	5.7	30
Judiciary	1	5
Police and security agencies	1	5
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	0.6	3
Other state executive agencies	0.6	3
Political parties	3.1	16
Unions and employees	0.2	1
Churches	0.2	1
Migrant and minority organisations	0.4	2
Pro-minority organisations	0.2	1
Racist and extreme right organisations	0.6	3
No addressee	59	309
Total	100	524

Table 8. Criticized actor

Criticized actor	%	n
Executive Governments	20.8	109
Police and security agencies	0.6	3
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	0.4	2
Other state executive agencies	0.6	3
Political parties	4.6	24
Employers organisations and firms	0.4	2
Media and journalists	0.6	3
Professional organisations	0.2	1
Migrant and minority organisations	0.6	3
Racist and extreme right organisations	0.6	3
Other organisations	0.2	1
No criticized actor	70.6	370
Total	100	524

5. ISSUES AND POSITIONS

An important aspect of the claims-making on immigration in Madrid, and Spain more generally, is the heavy presence of all sorts of claims that deal with general immigration, asylum and aliens politics (68%), and more specifically with entry and border controls (Tables 9 and 10). The various issue domains related to integration politics follow in a relevant second place (23%), with anti-racism claims or – on the opposite side – racist/xenophobic ones being quite marginal in the public sphere. This distribution is not surprising, given that Spain has only in the past ten years experienced a sharp increase in immigration flows, and managing these flows has become the overwhelming priority for all actors in the public arena and has dominated public debates, with integration politics become more salient due to the social consequences that these increasing flows have for Spanish society.

Table 9. Thematic focus

Thematic focus	%	N
IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM AND ALIENS POLITICS		
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	67.9	356
MINORITY INTEGRATION POLITICS		
Minority rights and participation	15.1	79
Minority integration general	3.1	16

Minority social problems	3.1	16
Discrimination and unequal treatment	1.5	8
ANTI-RACISM		
Racism in institutional contexts	2.5	13
Non-institutional racism, xenophobia and extreme right tendencies	2.5	13
XENOPHOBIC AND EXTREME RIGHT		
Xenophobic claims	2.7	14
Repressive measure	1.1	6
OTHER		
Other	0.2	1
General, unspecific claims	0.2	1
Electoral competition: purely tactical claims	0.2	1
Total	100	524

Table 10. Issue of the claim

Issue	%	n
IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM AND ALIENS POLITICS		
Entry and border controls	18.3	96
Institutional framework, responsibilities, procedures, costs	13.9	73
General evaluation or policy direction	9.4	49
Expulsions/deportations	7.6	40
Migration prevention in homeland countries	5.9	31
Recognition, residence rights, legal status and permits	4.8	25
Access to welfare services and the labour market	3.4	18
Registration and internal control	2.7	14
Other specific issues	1.9	10
MINORITY INTEGRATION POLITICS		
Political rights and participation	6.1	32
General evaluation or policy direction	4.3	22
Cultural rights and participation: religion	2.5	13
Social rights and participation: health and welfare	1.5	8

Issue	%	n
Social rights and participation: housing and segregation	1.1	6
Social rights and participation: education	0.2	1
Social rights and participation: labour market	0.6	3
Social rights and participation: other/general	0.6	3
Cultural rights and participation: (recognition of) group id	1	5
Cultural rights and participation: education	0.2	1
Cultural rights and participation: other/general	0.2	1
Other rights and participation	0.8	4
Discrimination in the labour market	0.4	2
Discrimination in health and welfare services	0.2	1
Discrimination: other specific issues	0.2	1
Discrimination in the education system	0.2	1
Crime	1.9	10
Political violence and extremism	0.6	3
Other	0.8	4
GENERAL XENOPHOBIC CLAIMS & EXTREME RIGHT CLAIMS		
Xenophobic claims	2.7	14
Racist and extreme right language in politics	1.3	7
Racism in other state institutions	1	5
ANTI-RACISM		
Moral appeals	1	5
Protection of minorities against violence	0.6	3
Police racism and violence against minorities	0.4	2
Countermobilization	0.2	1
Other specific issues	0.4	2
OTHER		
World War II/Holocaust	0.2	1
Nationalist and revanchist claims	0.2	1
General, unspecific claims	0.2	1
Electoral competition: purely tactical claims	0.2	1

Issue	%	n
No issue	0.8	4
Total	100	524

One important aspect of the way these various issues are portrayed and presented by the multiple actors that intervene in the public sphere is the fact that there is a general positive approach towards immigrants and ethnic minorities from all actors, except of course racist and extreme right organisations (Table 11). Even institutional and governmental actors show invariably a positive position with regard to immigrant minorities, and particularly so the legislative branch of Government. Interestingly enough, the least positive interventions come from political parties, unions and executive branches of government, possibly indicating the starting point of a change of approach towards immigration policies that had been quite positive in the previous years.

As we could expect, civil society organisations, and particularly migrant and pro-migrant organisations, are almost invariably holding positive positions towards migrant minorities in their public interventions.

Table 11. Mean position towards the issue by actors

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Executive Governments	219	0.32	0.668
Legislatures	17	0.71	0.470
Judiciary	5	0.20	0.447
Police and security agencies	23	0.26	0.619
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	19	0.53	0.513
Other state executive agencies	7	0.57	0.787
Political parties	96	0.14	0.829
Unions and employees	18	0.28	0.752
Employers organisations and firms	2	0	1.414
Churches	5	0.80	0.447
Professional organisations and groups	18	0.61	0.698
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	28	0.93	0.262
Antiracist organisations and groups	11	1	0.000
Pro-minority organisations and groups	18	1	0.000
General solidarity organisations and groups	3	1	0.000
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	7	-1	.
Radical left organisations and groups	1	1	.

Other civil society organisations and groups	14	0.57	0.756
Total	515	0.39	0.712

Mean from the values: -1: anti-minority, xenophobic / 0: neutral, ambivalent, technocratic / 1: pro-minority, anti racist

6. OBJECTS OF CLAIMS

When we turn to analyse the objects of the instances of claims-making on immigration issues, the scene is dominated by debates around irregular or illegal immigrants (45%) and immigrants as a whole (32%), as shown in Table 12. References to specific national or ethnic groups or to the Muslim community are relatively infrequent, as they also are references to specific categorisations around ethnic or racial lines, which are very uncommon in Spanish public debate, where – if anything – national origins are identified.

Table 12. Identity of the object of the claim

Identity of object of claim	%	n
Illegal aliens/immigrants	45.2	236
(Im)migrants/re-migrants	32.4	169
Specific national or ethnic group	6.1	32
Muslim/ Islamic	5.9	31
Labour migrants, contract workers	1.7	9
Asylum seekers	1.5	8
Ethnic minorities/groups	1.3	7
Jewish/Israelite	1	5
Foreigners/aliens	0.8	4
Racial minorities/groups	0.8	4
Migrants and minorities unspecified	0.6	3
War refugees	0.6	3
Orthodox	0.6	3
Black	0.4	2
Asian	0.2	1
Minorities	0.4	2
EU citizens	0.4	2
Not applicable: claim outside the thematic field	0.2	1
Total	100	523

In this regard, African origins of the objects of public debate are most often identified, and again Latin American immigrants are much less present in public discourses around immigration than their proportional weight would lead us to expect (Table 13). This is,

undoubtedly, related to the media salience attributed to the estival crisis of boat arrivals from Africa.

Table 13. Nationality of the object of the claim

Nationality of object of claim	%	n
Not applicable: no specific minority or migrant object	78.1	409
African: other	13	68
Other Europe	2.9	15
Latin American	2.3	12
Africa: north	1.3	7
Old European minorities	1.1	6
Asia: South and East	1	5
Other	0.4	2
Total	100	524

In relation to this, Table 14 shows that there is a general consistency in the prevalence of status groups as the main identifier of the objects of claims regardless of the type of actor that makes the claim or public intervention. Racial, religious, national or hyphenated objects are seldom the object of public debates, with the exception of those interventions made by migrant and minority organisations themselves, where references to religious groups prevail.

Racial groups are more often referred to by professional organisations and groups, by migrant and minority organisations, and (logically) by racist and extreme right groups. Religious groups are frequently the object of claims – as we could expect – by religious and church organisations, but also importantly by migrant and minority organisations. National and ethnic groups are identified more often in the interventions by Executives, and trade unions, as well as the migrant/minority organisations. While hyphenated national and ethnic groups are almost exclusively referred to by the police and security agencies, especially in relation to issues around Latino youth urban bands.

Table 14. Identity of the object by type of actor

Actor	Identity of object of the claim						Total
	Status group	Racial groups	Religious group	National and ethnic groups	Hyphenated national and ethnic groups	Not applicable	
Executive Governments	85.2	0.4	4	10.3	0	0	223
Legislatives	100	0	0	0	0	0	17

Actor	Identity of object of the claim						Total
	Status group	Racial groups	Religious group	National and ethnic groups	Hyphenated national and ethnic groups	Not applicable	
Judiciary	100	0	0	0	0	0	5
Police and security agencies	79.2	0	8.3	4.2	4.2	4.2	24
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	100	0	0	0	0	0	19
Other state executive agencies	100	0	0	0	0	0	7
Political parties	93.8	0	3.1	3.1	0	0	97
Unions and employees	89.5	0	0	10.5	0	0	19
Employers organisations and firms	50	0	50	0	0	0	2
Churches	0	0	100	0	0	0	5
Professional organisations and groups	77.8	11.1	5.6	5.6	0	0	18
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	17.9	7.1	57.1	17.9	0	0	28
Antiracist organisations and groups	81.8	0	9.1	9.1	0	0	11
Pro-minority organisations and groups	100	0	0	0	0	0	18
General solidarity organisations and groups	100	0	0	0	0	0	3
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	42.9	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	0	7
Radical left organisations and groups	0	0	0	0	100	0	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	85.7	7.1	0	7.1	0	0	14

Actor	Identity of object of the claim						Total
	Status group	Racial groups	Religious group	National and ethnic groups	Hyphenated national and ethnic groups	Not applicable	
Unknown actors	0	75	0	25	0	0	4
Total	83	1.3	7.5	7.5	0.6	0.2	522

With regard to the nationality of the object of the claim, Table 15 shows that there are no relevant variations in relation to the nationality of objects of claims depending on the type of actor that makes the claim. In most cases, no specific minority or migrant group is specified – consistent with the results that status groups and general immigrants are most frequently referred to in public interventions – but when any is identified these are usually of African origin for all types of actors.

Table 15. Nationality of the object by type of actor

Actor	Nationality of the object of the claim								Total
	Not applicable: no specific minority or migrant object	Africa: north	African: other	Asia: South and East	Latin American	Old European minorities	Other	Other Europe	
Governments	72.3	1.8	17.9	0.9	3.1	0.9	0	3.1	224
Legislatives	88.2	0	11.8	0	0	0	0	0	17
Judiciary	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Police and security agencies	56	0	40	4	0	0	0	0	25
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	94.7	0	5.3	0	0	0	0	0	19
Other state executive agencies	85.7	0	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	7
Political parties	90.7	0	4.1	0	1	1	1	2.1	97
Unions and employees	84.2	0	5.3	0	0	0	0	10.5	19

Actor	Nationality of the object of the claim								Total
	Not applicable: no specific minority or migrant object	Africa: north	African: other	Asia: South and East	Latin American	Old European minorities	Other	Other Europe	
Employers organisations and firms	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Churches	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Professional organisations and groups	83.3	0	5.6	5.6	5.6	0	0	0	18
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	71.4	0	0	3.6	7.1	7.1	0	10.7	28
Antiracist organisations and groups	81.8	9.1	0	0	0	9.1	0	0	11
Pro-minority organisations and groups	77.8	5.6	11.1	0	5.6	0	0	0	18
General solidarity organisations and groups	66.7	0	33.3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	57.1	0	14.3	0	0	0	14.3	14.3	7
Radical left organisations and groups	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	78.6	0	21.4	0	0	0	0	0	14
Unknown actors	75	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	4
Total	78.1	1.3	13	1	2.3	1.1	0.4	2.9	524

7. SCOPE VARIABLES

The final section of our descriptive presentation of the results for Madrid/Spain looks into the territorial scope of the actors, addressees, criticised actors, and issues that are included in the claims identified.

As we could expect, all of them – actors, addressees, criticised actors and issues – are most frequently national in scope (Table 16). Hence, the national arena prevails in the configuration of public debates around immigration in Madrid and in Spain. Yet, it is important to note that the subnational level is also quite important in our case, especially for actors and – to a smaller degree – for the issues. This is consistent with the overall institutional configuration of the Spanish political system, a quasi-federal system where regions (*Comunidades Autónomas*) and municipalities have substantial powers in several important domains of policy-making, especially in what regards integration policies. On the other hand, the relevance of supra- or transnational levels should not be fully disregarded, as they have been quite presence in all interventions related to the need of coordinating border control and management of immigration flows to Spain.

Table 16. Scope of actors, addressees, criticized actors and issues

Scope	Actor	Addressee	Criticized actor	Issue
Supra- or transnational: European	5.9	3.6	3.6	11.3
Supra- or transnational: other	2.5	1.1	-	6.1
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	3.2	1.7	0.8	4.6
Foreign national: other	2.3	1.3	1.1	-
Bilateral	0.2	0	0.2	4.8
National	48.7	27.1	17.7	53.4
Subnational	34.4	6.3	5.9	17.2
National or subnational	2.1	0.6	0.6	1.9
Unknown: no organisation/No verbal claim	0.8	58.2	70	0.8
Total (n=524)	100	100	100	100

In Table 17 we can see that subnational issues are more often put forward by non-institutional actors, such as civil society organisations. But political parties, unions and professional organisations are also frequently concerned with issues that are subnational in scope. It is interested to note that ‘homeland’ issues are really absent from the public discourse of almost all actors, with the exception of legislative branches of Government that are more attentive to the link between immigrants and their countries of origins. But, interestingly enough, ‘homeland’ issues are completely absent from the public discourse of migrant and minority organisations that newspapers capture – which is not to say that it is fully absent from their daily practices and discourse, but just that they are not very vocal about these issues in ways that the press would notice.

Table 17. Scope of the issue by type of actor

Actors	scope of issue								Total
	no verbal claim	European	Supra- or transnational: other	Migrant homelands and exile	Bilateral	National	Subnat.	National or subnat.	
Executive Governments	0	18.8	8.5	8	8	43.3	11.2	2.2	224
Legislatives	0	11.8	11.8	11.8	0	58.8	5.9	0	17
Judiciary	20	0	0	0	0	60	0	20	5
Police and security agencies	4	0	8	12	8	56	8	4	25
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	0	5.3	5.3	0	0	73.7	15.8	0	19
Other state executive agencies	0	0	14.3	0	0	71.4	14.3	0	7
Political parties	0	7.2	1	1	0	71.1	19.6	0	97
Unions and employees	0	0	0	0	0	68.4	31.6	0	19
Employers organisations and firms	0	0	0	0	50	50	0	0	2
Churches	0	0	20	0	0	40	40	0	5
Professional organisations and groups	0	5.6	0	0	5.6	44.4	44.4	0	18
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	0	14.3	0	0	3.6	57.1	25	0	28
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	0	9.1	0	0	81.8	9.1	0	11
Pro-minority organisations and groups	5.6	0	0	0	0	50	44.4	0	18
General solidarity organisations and groups	0	0	33.3	0	0	66.7	0	0	3
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	14.3	0	0	0	0	42.9	14.3	28.6	7
Radical left organisations	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	1

Actors	scope of issue								Total
	no verbal claim	European	Supra- or transnational: other	Migrant homelands and exile	Bilateral	National	Subnat.	National or subnat.	
and groups									
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	14.3	14.3	0	14.3	14.3	35.7	7.1	14
Unknown actors	0	0	25	0	0	75	0	0	4
Total	0.8	11.3	6.1	4.6	4.8	53.4	17.2	1.9	524

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In this descriptive report we have discussed the main findings that help us characterise the nature of the public discourse around immigration and immigrants in Madrid. One important caveat to make is that – although our primary interest is on the local level – it is very difficult to disentangle public discourse and claims-making at the local level from that at the national level, as the latter dominates the public arena in many ways. This is even more clear in the case of Madrid within Spain because it is the capital city of the country, but also because Madrid lacks a purely local printed press of any relevance.

The importance of the national level is evident in what relates to the nature of the actors that make the interventions, but importantly also in the territorial scope of the issues that make it to the news. Partly, this is due to the fact that the national government retains control of the main policy domains that have attracted most of the public attention in 2006: border control and the management of entry flows. But partly this is also due to the nature of the main ‘newsworthy’ events that have dominated a substantial portion of the news cycle related to immigration in that particular year: the crisis of massive arrivals of African immigrants to Spanish coasts during the Summer months.

Given this, it is not surprising that the main issues that shape public discourse around immigration in Madrid, and Spain more generally, are related to ‘immigration, asylum, and aliens politics’, followed at a distance by ‘integration politics’. From this, it almost logically follows that institutional – and in particular governmental – actors will prevail in the public arena given the nature of these issues.

What is not so obvious – given the size of the inflows and their societal and mediatic impact – is that the overall approach towards immigrant minorities of all actors implied – racist and extreme right groups excepted – should remain positive. This is an interesting result of our data collection, which actually matches the general positive approach towards immigrants that we found in the institutional component of Political Opportunity Structures (see Deliverable 5 of this project), and leads to conclude that the overall structure of opportunities makes of the Madrid and Spanish cases a relatively

open one for immigrants civic and political integration (see Deliverable 7b for the comparative report with all cities).

Finally, our results indicate that – as of 2006 – the public discourse in Madrid and Spain with regard to migrant minorities did not include many cases of segmentation around specific racial, ethnic or religious identities. Migrant minorities were almost invariably referred to as status groups ('immigrants' 'illegal immigrants' 'economic immigrants', etc.), rather than by their racial, ethnic, national or religious affiliations. However, in the claims-making of certain actors – most notably migrant and minority organisations themselves – religious categories were relatively frequent. This could point to future developments where religious identities – especially around Muslim-background immigrants – could become increasingly salient in public debates. But, until now, there is no clear indication that racial, ethnic or national identities are becoming salient in the Spanish public arena.

Introduction

This country report aims to offer a brief review of claim-making data for the Zurich case and thereby shedding some light on discursive opportunity structures for migrants' political integration in this city. Data have been collected on Monday, Wednesday and Friday issues of the nationwide daily *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ). The NZZ is a Zurich-based newspaper with a daily circulation of 143'000 and a reputation of high quality journalism. The paper has been traditionally close to the Free Democrats (*Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei*), taking a decidedly liberal stance on many issues.

Coding was done by one coder following the "Localmultidem WP1 Codebook." The total number of claims collected is N=214, but for the purpose of the following analysis only claims inside the thematic fields of immigration, asylum and aliens politics, minority integration issues as well as antiracism, xenophobia and interethnic relations have been included. The sample was further reduced by excluding claims taking the form of repressive measures, which led to a final sample size of N = 181.

Table 1: Distribution of claims by month

	Frequency	Percent
January	17	9.4
February	6	3.3
March	15	8.3
April	18	9.9
May	13	7.2
June	14	7.7
July	12	6.6
August	22	12.2
September	32	17.7
October	8	4.4
November	14	7.7
December	10	5.5
Total	181	100.0

The distribution of claims over the year shows two clear peaks in August and September (Table 1). This can be accounted for by the national referendum on revised asylum and aliens legislation. A coalition of solidarity groups and left-wing political parties opposed

¹⁹ This report has been prepared by Noé Wiener, research research associate of the Swiss team of the Localmultidem project.

the modifications and collected the necessary signatures (50'000 for each the amendment to the asylum law and the newly proposed federal law on foreigners) to hold a referendum. On 24 September 2006, a majority of voters accepted both propositions. Before this date, claims on the topic were typically made by party delegates deciding on the party's official position, interest groups giving similar recommendations, or government officials defending the new law. The issue was object of public discussion until the end of the year, with the focus shifting to questions such as "in which spirit" (i.e. the actual administrative practices) the law should be applied.

Another important event that led to several claims concerning interreligious dialogue and other integration issues was the so-called "Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy." Many claims by churches as well as migrant actors can be traced back to this discussion.

Actors

Confronted with all these instances of public claim-making an obvious question to begin with is: Who is making the claim? The analysis of different types of claimants reveals a relatively unequal distribution (Table 2).

Table 2: Summary of actor

	Frequency	Percent
State and party actors	120	66.3
Governments	36	19.9
Legislatives and political parties	58	32.0
Judiciary	8	4.4
State executive agencies	18	9.9
Civil society actors	61	33.7
Socioeconomic interest groups	6	3.3
Migrants and minorities	11	6.1
Extreme-right and racist actors	8	4.4
Antiracist and pro-minority groups	7	3.9
Other civil society groups	29	16.0
Total	181	100.0

State actors and political parties taken together account for two thirds, civil society actors for one third of all claims. Migrant and minority actors are clearly underrepresented in this sample, being the source of only 6.1% of all discursive interventions.

The main claimant was most often national in scope (53%), followed by subnational (35%) (Table 3). Foreign national or transnational actors account for 7.2%. This weak proportion of non-national actors applies to all scope variables in the sample. In 8 cases the scope could not be determined, which often meant that the actor was not further specified or did not represent any organisation.

Table 3: Scope of actor

	Frequency	Percent
European	3	1.7
Other supra- or trans-national	5	2.8
Foreign-based/bilateral	5	2.8
National or subnational	160	88.4
Unknown	8	4.4
Total	181	100.0

If we break down this scope variable by actor groups, distinguishing only state/party actors and civil society actors, we find no significant difference in the proportion of non-national actors (Table 4). It seems that for our sample, international state actors (5 cases) were equally unlikely to engage in discursive interventions as international non-governmental organizations (8 cases).

Table 4: Actor scope by actor type

		Actor group			
		State and party actors	Civil society actors	Total	
Scope of actor	European	Count	3	0	3
		% within Actor group	2.5%	.0%	1.7%
	Other supra- or trans-national	Count	1	4	5
		% within Actor group	.8%	7.4%	2.9%
	Foreign-based/bilateral	Count	1	4	5
		% within Actor group	.8%	7.4%	2.9%
	National or subnational	Count	114	46	160
		% within Actor group	95.8%	85.2%	92.5%
Total	Count	119	54	173	

		Actor group		
		State and party actors	Civil society actors	Total
Scope of European actor	Count	3	0	3
	% within Actor group	2.5%	.0%	1.7%
	Other supra- or trans-national	1	4	5
	% within Actor group	.8%	7.4%	2.9%
	Foreign-based/bilateral	1	4	5
	% within Actor group	.8%	7.4%	2.9%
	National or subnational	114	46	160
	% within Actor group	95.8%	85.2%	92.5%
Count		119	54	173
% within Actor group		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Where known, the party affiliation of claimants has been coded. Apart from claims made in the name of a political party, this mainly concerned members of government. A particularity of the year 2006 was the frequent and discordant participation of members of the federal council in immigration-related discourses. The Swiss federal council is supposed to follow the principle of collegiality, implying that all federal councillors support the council's official position after an agreement has been reached. However, this principle has lost of its importance during Christoph Blocher's time as federal councillor (2003-2007). It was therefore not always easy to decide whether a specific instance of claim-making should be attributed to the person as a federal councillor or as a party member.

Table 5: Party affiliation of claimants

	Frequen cy	Percent
Swiss People's Party (right)	28	38.9
Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland (centre)	10	13.9
Social Democratic Party (left)	9	12.5
Free Democratic Party (centre-right)	8	11.1
Green Party (left)	4	5.6
Swiss Democrats (far-right)	3	4.2
Federal Democratic Union (right)	3	4.2
Evangelical People's Party (centre)	2	2.8
Alternative List (far-left)	1	1.4
Christian Social Party (left)	1	1.4

Freedom Party (far-right)	1	1.4
Party for Zurich (far-right)	1	1.4
Labour Party (far-left)	1	1.4
Total	72	100.0

Not surprisingly, the four largest political parties, all members of the national coalition government, represent three fourths of all instances of claim-making (Table 5). The Swiss People's Party is over-represented in proportion to the votes received in the 2003 national council elections (26.7%), while the Social Democrats (23.3%) and the Free Democrats (17.3%) are underrepresented. This might reflect the relative importance of immigration-related issues in their respective political platforms.

Among the 11 claims in our sample made by migrant or minority actors, only 4 contained information about the nationality or ethnicity of the claimants. These were Congolese, Nigerian, Romanian and Turkish. This small number of cases does not suggest need for further analysis.

Forms of action

The next step of the analysis concerns the way in which claims were made in the public sphere. Verbal statements are clearly the dominant form of claim-making (66.3%), followed by political decisions (29.3%) (Table 6). Conventional political action, including judicial action, direct-democratic forms of action and petitioning represent a mere 2.8%, whereas only 3 claims took forms of demonstrative or violent protest.

Table 6: Forms of action

	Frequency	Percent
Political decision	53	29.3
Public statement	120	66.3
Conventional political action	5	2.8
Demonstrative protest	2	1.1
Violent protest	1	.6
Total	181	100.0

Breaking down the forms of action by actor groups reveals the following pattern (Table 7). Political decisions are evenly distributed between state actors (where they occurred on all levels of administration and concerned government, parliament, judiciary as well as executive agencies) and political parties. For parties, this most often meant decisions by delegates on immigration-related popular initiatives or referenda. Verbal statements were the preferred form of claim-making by all actors except parties. Civil society actors other than right-wing extremists and migrant groups resorted exclusively to this form of action.

It is also worth noting that migrant actors were alone in mobilizing for non-violent protest, while the only case of violent protests is due to extreme-right groups.

To further simplify the analysis we can distinguish state and party actors on the one hand and civil society actors on the other, and look only at political decisions and verbal statements. The group of state and party actors resorted to political decisions in 50 cases (41,7%) and to verbal statements in 66 cases (55%). Civil society actors were in general without real political decision-making power, thus resolutions by these actors were often verbal statements (with the exception of resolutions by far-right political parties, coded as extreme-right groups). Accordingly, this form of action accounts for 54 cases (88,5%) made by civil society actors.

Table 7: Form of claim by actor type

			Actor group		
			State and party actors	Civil society actors	Total
Form of claim	Political decision	Count	50	3	53
		% within Actor group	41.7%	4.9%	29.3%
	Public statement	Count	66	54	120
		% within Actor group	55.0%	88.5%	66.3%
	Conventional political action	Count	4	1	5
		% within Actor group	3.3%	1.6%	2.8%
	Demonstrative protest	Count	0	2	2
		% within Actor group	.0%	3.3%	1.1%
	Violent protest	Count	0	1	1
		% within Actor group	.0%	1.6%	.6%
Total		Count	120	61	181
		% within Actor group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Addressees and criticized actors

Claims rarely mentioned a specific addressee or an actor group at which a call to action was clearly directed. The coding for the addressee variable therefore followed a rather interpretative approach that could have slightly biased the outcome. It might be useful to mention a few of the coding principles applied:

- Recommendations on how to vote in popular initiatives or referenda were usually coded as being directed to the members of the organisation making the claim (e.g. an employers' federation welcoming a revision of foreigners law).
- If a similar claim seemed to be directed more to the general population in possession of the necessary political rights, political party was chosen for the addressee variable.
- Criticized actors were more easily identifiable. However, the direct democratic instruments of popular initiatives and referenda deserve some further specification, since they concerned many cases in the sample. As the following table shows, claims that were supportive of a popular initiative to modify existing law but did not mention a specific criticized actor (e.g. asylum abuse) were interpreted as being critical of current public policy in the area (Table 8). However, a claim in favour of a referendum is in fact supportive of a new legislative proposal.
- Statements on integration issues were often combined complaints about insufficient or wrong policy on the one hand and perceived lack of willingness to assimilate from the part of immigrants on the other hand. Depending on which side of the argument seemed more heavily emphasized, either government or migrants was coded for criticized actor.

Table 8: Criticized actor for claims concerning direct democratic action

	Popular initiative	Referendum
approving claim	government, unless accompanied by specific blaming	most important member of the referendary committee (usually party actors)
disapproving claim	most important member of the initiative committee (usually party actors)	government, unless accompanied by specific blaming

Taken together, these coding principles might have led to a more or less substantial over-weighting of government, party actors and migrant organisations for the addressee and the criticized actor variable.

Table 9: Summary of addressees

	Frequency	Percent
State and party actors	141	79.2
Governments	71	39.9
Legislatives and political parties	50	28.1
Judiciary	2	1.1
State executive agencies	18	10.1
Civil society actors	37	20.8
Socioeconomic interest groups	2	1.1
Migrants and minorities	11	6.2
Extreme-right and racist actors	2	1.1
Antiracist and pro-minority groups	2	1.1
Other civil society groups	20	11.2
Total	178	100.0

Given the above caveats, it comes as no surprise to see a bimodal distribution of the addressee variable in our sample, with government actors representing almost 40% and political parties and legislatures 28.1% of all claims (Table 9). Another remarkable peak is visible for state executive agencies, most often those dealing exclusively with migration issues. It seems that many actors specifically called upon the responsible branch of administration (e.g. the Federal Office for Migration) to change policy implementation.

The addressees' scope reveals a comparable pattern to the claimants' scope (Table 10). The vast majority of addressees were of national (62.3%) or subnational scope (28.4%). In 8% of the cases no clear-cut distinction between the two could be made. If no clear addressee was mentioned in the claim but the claimant presumably expected some form of government intervention, the executive at the national level was coded. Foreign actors rarely played a role as addressee of claims in this thematic field.

Table 10: Summary of scope of addressee

	Frequency	Percent
Foreign-based/bilateral	2	1.2
National or subnational	160	98.8
Total	162	100.0

Next we take a closer look at the question *who addressed whom?* The limited size of our sample (N=181) leads only to some cautious conclusions and detailed analysis on a too small number of cases. The original categories of the claimant variable differentiate amongst almost 20 types of actors. Relating for example the addressee and claimant variables in such a way would produce an enormous contingency table with many frequencies close to zero. We have chosen here to merge categories and give some additional details where appropriate.

Table 11: Addressee by actor type

			Actor group		Total
			State and party actors	Civil society actors	
Addressee	State and party actors	Count	98	43	141
		% within Actor group	82.4%	72.9%	79.2%
	Civil society actors	Count	21	16	37
		% within Actor group	17.6%	27.1%	20.8%
Total		Count	119	59	178
		% within Actor group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The above table shows no clear difference between state/party and civil society claimants for the addressee variable, but only a slight tendency by both actor types to privilege other actors of the same type as their addressees (Table 11). Twelve claims for which both claimant and addressee are governments can be explained by demands directed to other administrative levels in the federal system. Twenty-nine claims originating from and directed towards political parties are often related to the functioning of the direct-democratic instruments as explained above.

A crosstabulation of addressee actors by main claimant shows no remarkable differences (Table 12).

Table 12: Scope of addressee by actor type

			Actor type		Total
			State and party actors	Civil society actors	
Scope of addressee	Foreign-based/bilateral	Count % within sssactor1	2 1.8%	0 .0%	2 1.2%
	National or subnational	Count % within sssactor1	108 98.2%	52 100.0%	160 98.8%
Total		Count	110	52	162
		% within sssactor1	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

While the addressee of the claim is the actor at whom a call to action is overtly directed, the criticized actors are those mentioned in a negative way in the claim. Thus, while there were a large number of cases for which an addressee but no criticized actor was coded, the opposite case never occurred. Most likely, a critique always implied a call to change. As the following table reveals, the most frequently criticized actors were governments (46%), followed by migrants (32%) and political parties (16%) (Table 13). The order is thus not quite the same as for the addressee variable, where government and party actors are on the first and second place, but migrant organisations rank only fifth.

Table 13: Summary of criticized actors

	Frequency	Percent
State and party actors	67	58.3
Governments	46	40.0
Legislatives and political parties	16	13.9
State executive agencies	5	4.3
Civil society actors	48	41.7
Socioeconomic interest groups	2	1.7
Migrants and minorities	32	27.8
Extreme-right and racist actors	1	.9
Antiracist and pro-minority groups	4	3.5
Other civil society groups	9	7.8
Total	115	100.0

The vast majority of criticized actors were national or subnational in their organisational scope, whereas foreign-based or transnational actors account for only five claims (Table 14).

Table 14: Summary of scope of criticized actor

	Frequency	Percent
Other supra- or trans-national	1	1.4
Foreign-based/bilateral	4	5.5
National or subnational	68	93.2
Total	73	100.0

The aggregated group of non-state actors more frequently criticized state (70.7%) than non-state actors (29.3%), whereas state and party actors themselves show no clear preference for one of the two large actor types.

Table 15: Criticized actor by actor type

		Actor group		
		State and party actors	Civil society actors	Total
Governments	Count	27	19	46
	% within Actor group	36.5%	46.3%	40.0%
Legislatives and political parties	Count	7	9	16
	% within Actor group	9.5%	22.0%	13.9%
State executive agencies	Count	4	1	5
	% within Actor group	5.4%	2.4%	4.3%
Socioeconomic interest groups	Count	1	1	2
	% within Actor group	1.4%	2.4%	1.7%
Migrants and minorities	Count	27	5	32
	% within Actor group	36.5%	12.2%	27.8%
Extreme-right and racist actors	Count	0	1	1
	% within Actor group	.0%	2.4%	.9%
Antiracist and pro-minority groups	Count	4	0	4
	% within Actor group	5.4%	.0%	3.5%

Other civil society groups	Count	4	5	9
	% within Actor group	5.4%	12.2%	7.8%
Total	Count	74	41	115
	% within Actor group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As for the two most frequently criticized actors, governments are most often criticized by political parties (32.6%) followed by government actors (17,4%) while migrants organizations are criticized by parties (40.6%) and governments (18.6%) but very rarely by civil society actors (15.6%) (Table 15).

Table 16: Scope of criticized actor by actor type

			Actor type		Total
			State and party actors	Civil society actors	
Scope of criticized actor	Other supra- or trans-national	Count % within sssactor1	1 2.2%	0 .0%	1 1.4%
	Foreign-based/bilateral	Count % within sssactor1	2 4.3%	2 7.4%	4 5.5%
	National or subnational	Count % within sssactor1	43 93.5%	25 92.6%	68 93.2%
Total		Count % within sssactor1	46 100.0%	27 100.0%	73 100.0%

As for all other scope variables, the proportion of non-national criticized actors (e.g. homeland governments) is too weak to permit any conclusive analysis (Table 16).

Issues and position

Table 17: Summary of issue of claims

	Frequency	Percent
Immigration, asylum, aliens politics	85	47.0
Residence rights and recognition	53	29.3
Entry and exit	3	1.7
Institutional framework and costs	5	2.8
Other	24	13.3
Minority integration politics	76	42.0
Citizenship and political rights	18	9.9
Social rights	12	6.6
Religious and cultural rights	21	11.6
Antiracism, xenophobia and interethnic relations	20	11.0
Discrimination and unequal treatment	6	3.3
Minority social problems	9	5.0
Other/general integration issues	10	5.5
Institutional racism	4	2.2
Noninstitutional racism and xenophobia	16	8.8
Total	181	100.0

The largest category is “recognition, residence rights, legal status and permits” with almost 30% of all cases (Table 17). This is almost exclusively due to the many claims concerned with the revision of the asylum and foreigners law, which was subject to a popular referendum as mentioned above. Taken together immigration, asylum, and aliens politics accounts for 47% of the sample.

“Cultural rights and participation: religion” (11%) stands out as another key category, which concerned for the most part the Muslim community and issues such as minaret

construction or religious education. 18 claims treated questions of migrants' political participation and the acquisition of citizenship (9.9%). The minority rights and participation category as a whole represents a quarter of all instances of claim-making, while other issues of integration, discrimination and racism account for the rest of the sample.

Have there been significant differences in the topics of the claims depending on who was the claimant? Again, the low number of cases prevents us from conducting a deep analysis. It seems however, that civil society actors were more likely to engage in public discourse on issues of antiracism and xenophobia compared to state and party actors, while the latter made almost as many claims about immigration as about integration politics (Table 18). One might think that non-state actors fill in a gap here when talking about institutional racism, but the few claims on this issue are evenly distributed between both actor types. Differences higher than 10 percentage points occur only for the "non-institutional racism and xenophobia" subfield, dominated by non-state actors, though absolute difference is low. Other interesting differences concern the "residence rights and recognition" issues which includes the revision of asylum law and accounts for 31.7% of state and party actor claims but only for 24.6% of civil society claims. "Citizenship and political rights" was the topic of 11.7% of state actor statements but merely of 6.6% for non-state actors. Only one claim among the 18 concerning citizenship and political rights stems from a migrant organisation. The distribution for all other variables is not markedly different between the two actor types.

Table 18: Summary of issue by actor type

		Actor group		Total
		State and party actors	Civil society actors	
Broad issue	Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	Count 58 48.3%	27 44.3%	85 47.0%
	Minority integration politics	Count 54 45.0%	22 36.1%	76 42.0%
	Antiracism, xenophobia and interethnic relations	Count 8 6.7%	12 19.7%	20 11.0%
Total		Count 120 100.0%	61 100.0%	181 100.0%

In order to assess the general position of a claim towards immigrants, their rights and situation, a *position* variable was coded. A value of -1 indicates anti-minority and xenophobic, 0 an ambivalent, neutral or technocratic and +1 a pro-minority or anti-racist position. The following table gives its arithmetic mean for each actor group as well as standard deviation. A low value for standard deviation implies that data points are relatively close to the hypothetical average position, while a value close to 1 means wide dispersion.

Table 19: Mean of position of claims towards issue by actor

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
summary first actor			
State and party actors	-.03	120	.943
Governments	.03	36	.941
Legislatives and political parties	-.17	58	.958
Judiciary	.38	8	.916
State executive agencies	.11	18	.900
Civil society actors	.52	61	.788
Socioeconomic interest groups	.33	6	.816
Migrants and minorities	.91	11	.302
Extreme-right and racist actors	-1.00	8	.000
Antiracist and pro-minority groups	.86	7	.378
Other civil society groups	.76	29	.577
Total	.15	181	.930

The first observation that can be made is the slightly positive position for all actors combined, although the trend is not entirely clear (Table 19). While the values for migrant and antiracist groups as well as extreme-right actors come as no surprise, four actors with a significant number of claims ($N > 15$) deserve some attention. Governments have a mean position close to zero, but the high standard deviation implies that this is less a result of neutral claim-making and more of divergent positions cancelling each other out. State executive agencies on the other hand have a mean closer to the positive average value for all actors, indicating maybe some degree of advocacy claim-making. The mean for party actors is well below zero. Their claims however seem to be characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity, corresponding to the variety in the political spectrum. Finally, civil society groups are the biggest contributor to positive claim-making, with a relative low standard deviation indicating consistently pro-minority evaluations.

Object actors

As regards the identity of object actors, the distribution reveals several modes (Table 20). “Asylum seekers” (*Asylbewerber*) represent one third of all cases, primarily due to the asylum law revision mentioned above (as a principle, claims concerning the new laws were coded “asylum seekers” on the object variable, even though the legislation concerned alien regulation as well, unless this was clearly the major subject of the claim). The expression “foreigners/aliens” (*Ausländer*) was frequently used (18.8%) by most actors and in different circumstances. Another generic term, “(im)migrants” (*Migranten, Einwanderer*), was less popular (7.7%), as was unspecific labelling for migrants and minorities (8.8%). A peak is also visible for “Muslim,” with 10.5% of all cases. “Religious minorities” as a discursive labelling could often be read as being equivalent to “Muslim population.” Surprisingly, a specific national or ethnic label was given only in 7 cases, which permits no conclusive analysis of the relevant variable.

Table 20: Summary of object of claims

	Frequency	Percent
Extreme right	3	1.7
Status groups	116	64.1
foreigners/aliens	34	18.8
minorities	1	.6
(im)migrants/re-migrants	14	7.7
asylum seekers	59	32.6
war refugees, ontheemden	3	1.7
illegal aliens/immigrants, sans papiers, gedoogden	4	2.2
EU citizens	1	.6
Religious groups	29	16.0
religious minorities/groups	8	4.4
muslim/islamic	19	10.5
orthodox	1	.6
catholic	1	.6
National and ethnic groups	7	3.9
Migrants and minorities unspecified	16	8.8
Unknown	10	5.5

	Frequency	Percent
Extreme right	3	1.7
Status groups	116	64.1
foreigners/aliens	34	18.8
minorities	1	.6
(im)migrants/re-migrants	14	7.7
asylum seekers	59	32.6
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EU citizens	1	.6
Religious groups	29	16.0
religious minorities/groups	8	4.4
muslim/islamic	19	10.5
orthodox	1	.6
catholic	1	.6
National and ethnic groups	7	3.9
Total	181	100.0

A last cross-tabulation shows object labelling by actor groups (Table 21). One might hypothesize that some actors more often spoke of status groups (“migrants,” “asylum seekers”), while others would privilege national or ethnic labelling. The data however does not indicate any such tendency.

Table 21: Object of claims by actor type

		Actor group		
		State and party actors	Civil society actors	Total
Extreme right	Count	1	2	3
	% within Actor group	.9%	3.6%	1.8%
Status groups	Count	81	35	116
	% within Actor group	69.8%	63.6%	67.8%
Religious groups	Count	19	10	29
	% within Actor group	16.4%	18.2%	17.0%
National and ethnic groups	Count	4	3	7
	% within Actor group	3.4%	5.5%	4.1%
Migrants and minorities unspecified	Count	11	5	16
	% within Actor group	9.5%	9.1%	9.4%
Total	Count	116	55	171
	% within Actor group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Conclusion

Several points are worth retaining from the data analysed in this report. First, 2006 was a special year for migration-related discursive opportunities in Switzerland, because of the impact generated by the two referenda on immigration policy in of the same year. Government officials and party leaders interacted in a complex game of mutual blaming, attribution or retraction of support, where migrants often appeared as projection screen for varied forms of intervention but rarely as actors intervening directly in the public space. Two thirds of all claims were made by state or party actors, while migrants themselves represent a mere 6% of claimants and 27% of criticized actors. It is also remarkable for the Swiss context that, while public discourse remained centred on immigration flows and issues of recognition and residency, almost as many claims concerned minority integration. We have mentioned the impact of the Muhammad cartoons in Danish newspapers as one possible source, but others might have been endogenous. Finally, only 4% of claims have mentioned a specific national or ethnic group as their object, which seems relatively low by Swiss standards. However, this finding needs to be matched with the increasing labelling in terms of religious groups.

1. INTRODUCTION

The data collection for this component of the project was, in the case of Milan, undertaken with the systematic analysis of the Milan edition of the nation-wide paper *La Repubblica* for 6 alternate months of 2006.²¹ The local edition of this newspaper has a very detailed coverage of local news and thus was the best high-quality newspaper available, and hence the best choice for the data collection envisaged.²² The sampling and coding instructions common to all the Localmultidem teams were followed.

In terms of the political biases of the selected newspaper, it is generally acknowledged that *La Repubblica* is a newspaper with a centre-left leaning editorial line, with progressive political views usually close to the center-left coalition. Issues related to immigration are expected to be more easily reported and acknowledged than in other journals.


Turning to the analysis of the results obtained, for the half year of 2006 we have retrieved 424 instances of claims-making, which is by far the largest in all cities given the incomplete nature of the dataset. Figure 1 shows that there is some seasonality to claims-making around March and September. The peak in March is largely due to the inflation of claims-making around the legislative elections that were to take place 9-10 April 2006, and the administrative elections of Milan on 28 May 2006, whereas the peak around September is largely related to the numerous boat landings on Italian shores during the Summer months.

²⁰ This report was written by Laura Morales, the coordinator of the Localmultidem consortium, with data gathered by Katia Pilati, research associate of the Italian team.

²¹ The full 12 month period will be completed at a later stage and, hence, an updated version of this report will be produced. The months included are January, March, May, July, September, and November. The system of covering alternate months was considered best to cover the whole year cycle in half the time required, thus limiting biases of coverage that are related to seasonal claims making.

²² *La Repubblica* is the second most sold newspaper in Italy, after *Il Corriere della Sera*, nationwide. We have not been able to obtain sales figures for Milan from the main certifying agency, Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa. *La Repubblica* was chosen for coding instead of *Il Corriere* due to problems in accessing electronically the Milan edition of *Il Corriere*.

Figure 1. Timing of the claims



These results are reflecting the nature of many of the claims that have dominated the news coverage related to immigration and immigrants in 2006 in Italy: the crisis around an increasing number of arrivals of refugees, the crisis of massive arrivals to Italian shores of unauthorised migrants, and the intense political exchanges among the party elites on topics related to immigration flow-management and immigrants' integration (especially of Muslims).

2. ACTORS

The distribution of claims by types of actors in Milan reflects a clear dominance of institutional – state and party – actors in the public discourse and debate around immigration, at least as portrayed by the press (Table 2). And, in particular, governments, political parties and legislators get the lion share of all the forms of claims-making in the public arena (55% of all), leaving the Judiciary with only a symbolic presence in public interventions regarding immigration.

Civil society actors are much less vocal in this regard, with migrant organisations and groups taking the lead over other actors, such as church-related organisations, or pro-migrant organisations. Racist and extreme right organisations and groups are relatively vocal, and are more present in the Milanese and Italian public discourse than radical left, pro-migrant or anti-racist organisations.

Table 2. Type of actor

<i>Type of actor</i>	%	n
<i>State and party actors</i>	67	285
Executive Governments	25	106
Political parties	16	68
Legislatures	14	60
Police and security agencies	7	28
Judiciary	3.5	15
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	1	4
Other state executive agencies	1	4
<i>Civil society actors</i>	32	134
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	12	50
Churches	5	22
Professional organisations and groups	4	16
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	3	14
Radical left organisations and groups	2	10
Other civil society organisations and groups	2	7
General solidarity organisations and groups	1	5
Pro-minority organisations and groups	1	4
Employers organisations and firms	0.7	3
Media and journalists	0.7	3
Unions and employees	0.5	2
Antiracist organisations and groups	0.2	1
<i>Other actors</i>	0.4	2
Unknown actors	0.2	1
Missing	0.2	1
Total	100	424

Given the dominance of Executives, Legislatures, and political parties in immigration-related claims-making in the case of Milan and Italy, it is particularly important to analyse the partisan affiliation of these actors (Table 3). As we could expect, in this regard the larger share of the interventions (around a fifth) come from the two main parties – DS and FI – with center-left and center-right parties with approximately similar shares of the claims-making attention recorded in newspapers.

Table 3. Party of the actor

<i>Party of actor</i>	%	N
Democratici di Sinistra (DS)	11	47
Forza Italia (FI)	11	46
Alleanza Nazionale (AN)	6	24
Lega Nord	5	20
Rifondazione Comunista	2	9
Center-left coalition	2	10
Center-right coalition	2	9
Other smaller parties	13	55
Not applicable: no partisan actor	48	204
Total	100	424

In the few instances where the actor was of foreign origin (less than 10%), there is no evidence of any particular accumulation of any single nationality in the public arena (Table 4). Religious groups (Jewish and Muslims) tend to be somewhat more visible in this particular year. It is interesting to note that African actors – both Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan – are relatively more vocal in the public sphere.

Table 4. Nationality of the actor

<i>Nationality of actor</i>	%	n
Not applicable: no minority or migrant actor	92	389
Jewish (alone or with others)	2.8	12
Muslims	1.4	6
Sudanese	0.7	3
Ecuadorian	0.5	2
Egyptian (or with others)	0.5	2
Roma / Gypsy	0.5	2
Cape Verdian	0.2	1
Eritreans & Ethiopians	0.2	1
Senegalese	0.2	1
Chinese & Ukranian	0.2	1
Latin American (several)	0.2	1
Tunisian	0.2	1
Libya	0.2	1
Middle East	0.2	1
Total	100	424

3. FORMS OF INTERVENTION

When we turn our attention to the forms of intervention that the instances of claims-making take (Table 5), we find an overwhelming dominance of verbal statements, with political decisions taking a distant second place, and with all forms of protest less frequent (around 5% when all are aggregated). However, around 4% are repressive measures. This reflects an issue and policy-making domain, where ‘talking’ rather than ‘acting’ dominates the scene, at the same time that confrontation happens every so often.

Table 5. Forms of intervention

	%	N
Verbal statements	78.5	333
Political decisions	8.5	36
Repressive measure	4.2	18
Demonstrative protests	2.1	9
Meetings	1.9	8
Confrontational protests	1.9	8
Violent protests	1.4	6
Petitioning	1.2	5
Judicial action	0.2	1
Total	100	524

For most types of actors (see Table 6) verbal statements are also the dominant form of intervention, with the only logical exceptions of the judiciary, the security agencies, and racist and extreme right groups. In this regard, it is interesting to note that verbal statements are the dominant form of intervention even by actors that would logically be expected to intervene more often with political decisions (eg. Executives and Legislatives). Protest is restricted to civil society actors but, even for these, verbal statements dominate the scene; and migrant organisations rarely take on to the streets, even less so than pro-minority organisations.

Table 6. Forms of intervention by type of actor

	Repressive measure	Political decision	Verbal statem.	Meetings	Judicial action	Petition	Demonstr. protests	Confront. protests	Violent protests	Total
Executive Governments	1	12	83	3	0	1	0	0	0	100
Legislatives	0	10	87	2	0	0	2	0	0	100
Judiciary	20	40	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Police and security agencies	50	11	36	0	0	0	0	0	4	100
State	0	50	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	100

	Repressive measure	Political decision	Verbal statem.	Meetings	Judicial action	Petition	Demonstr. protests	Confront. protests	Violent protests	Total
executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants										
Other state executive agencies	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Political parties	0	6	88	0	0	3	3	0	0	100
Unions and employees	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Employers organisations and firms	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Churches	0	0	95	5	0	0	0	0	0	100
Media and journalists	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Professional organisations and groups	0	6	88	0	0	0	0	6	0	100
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	0	2	80	4	2	0	6	2	4	100
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Pro-minority organisations and groups	0	0	75	0	0	0	25	0	0	100
General solidarity organisations and groups	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	0	36	0	0	7	0	36	21	100
Radical left organisations and groups	0	0	90	0	0	0	0	10	0	100
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	0	71	0	0	14	14	0	0	100
Unknown actors	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	100

	Repressive measure	Political decision	Verbal statem.	Meetings	Judicial action	Petition	Demonstr. protests	Confront. protests	Violent protests	Total
Total	4	9	78	2	0	1	2	2	1	100

4. ADRESSEES AND CRITICIZED ACTORS

Having described the actors responsible for the claims and their forms of intervention, we turn our attention to the addressees of the claims. In the case we are studying (Milan/Italy), very often the interventions have no specific addressee (62% of them), but when they do, these are most often directed to Executive branches of Government (Table 7). This reflects the power Executives in immigration policy-making. For the same reason, Executives are the most likely targets of public criticism in claims-making events, but in many instances we cannot even identify a criticised actor (Table 8).

Table 7. Addressee of the claim

<i>Addressee of the claim</i>	%	N
Executive Governments	13	55
Legislatives	1.7	7
Judiciary	0.9	4
Police and security agencies	2.8	12
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	0.2	1
Other state executive agencies	0.2	1
Political parties	2.1	9
Churches	1.2	5
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	9.7	41
Pro-minority organisations	0.5	2
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	3.1	13
Radical left organisations	1.7	7
Other organisations	1.2	5
No addressee	62	262
Total	100	424

Table 8. Criticized actor

<i>Criticized actor</i>	%	n
Executive Governments	17.7	75
Legislatives	2.1	9
Judiciary	0.5	2
Police and security agencies	3.1	13
Other state executive agencies	0.2	1
Political parties	2.6	11
Employers organisations and firms	0.5	2
Churches	0.7	3
Media and journalists	0.5	2
Professional organisations	0.2	1
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	16.7	71
Pro-minority organisations	0.2	1
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	12.7	54
Radical left organisations and groups	2.6	11
Other organisations	0.9	4
No criticized actor	38.7	164
Total	100	424

5. ISSUES AND POSITIONS

An important aspect of the claims-making on immigration in Milan, and Italy more generally, is the even presence of all sorts of claims: general immigration, asylum and aliens politics (22%), minority integration politics (45%), and anti-racism (21%), as can be seen in Tables 9 and 10. Xenophobic / extreme right claims are also quite prominent (around 10%).

Table 9. Thematic focus

<i>Thematic focus</i>	%	N
IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM AND ALIENS POLITICS		
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	21.9	93
MINORITY INTEGRATION POLITICS		
Minority rights and participation	26.2	111
Minority integration general	4.2	18
Minority social problems	8.7	37

Discrimination and unequal treatment	3.8	16
Inter-ethnic, inter- and intra-organizational relations	0.9	4
ANTI-RACISM		
Racism in institutional contexts	5.7	24
Non-institutional racism, xenophobia and extreme right tendencies	15.1	64
XENOPHOBIC AND EXTREME RIGHT		
Xenophobic claims	5.0	21
ACTOR CLAIMS – MINORITIES		
Homeland politics	0.2	1
Other	0.7	3
OTHER CLAIMS REGARDING EXTREME RIGHT		
General, unspecific claims	5.0	21
World War II, 3 rd Reich, etc.	0.5	2
Extreme right opposition against political opponents	0.9	4
OTHER		
Repressive measure	0.7	3
Missing	0.2	1
Total	100	424

In terms of specific issues, claims related to cultural rights in the domains of religion and education are quite prominent, with a share of 13% and 6% respectively among a myriad of many and varied claims in the public sphere. It is also important to highlight the many issues that relate to claims that point to immigrants and minorities being the frequent subject of racist, xenophobic or discriminatory actions.

Table 10. Issue of the claim

<i>Issue</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>
IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM AND ALIENS POLITICS		
Institutional framework, responsibilities, procedures, costs	8.0	34
Entry and border controls	5.9	25
Registration and internal control	3.3	14
Recognition, residence rights, legal status and permits	1.9	8
General evaluation or policy direction	0.9	4
Expulsions/deportations	0.9	4

<i>Issue</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>
Migration prevention in homeland countries	0.7	3
Access to welfare services and the labour market	0.2	1
MINORITY INTEGRATION POLITICS		
Cultural rights and participation: religion	13	55
Cultural rights and participation: education	6.1	26
Political violence and extremism	5.0	21
General evaluation or policy direction	3.8	16
Crime	3.5	15
Social rights and participation: housing and segregation	3.1	13
Political rights and participation	1.9	8
Discrimination in politics	1.9	8
Discrimination in the police and the judiciary system	0.9	4
Social rights and participation: labour market	0.5	2
Social rights and participation: other/general	0.5	2
Other rights and participation	0.5	2
Discrimination: other specific issues	0.7	3
Naturalization and citizenship	0.2	1
Social rights and participation: health and welfare	0.2	1
Social rights and participation: language acquisition	0.2	1
Social rights and participation: education	0.2	1
Cultural rights and participation: (recognition of) group id	0.2	1
Cultural rights and participation: other/general		
Discrimination and unequal treatment: general evaluation or policy direction	0.2	1
Other minority social problems	0.2	1
Inter/intra-ethnic relations	0.7	3
Inter/intra-organizational relations	0.2	1
ANTI-RACISM		
Police racism and violence against minorities	5.4	23

<i>Issue</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>
Repression of racism/xenophobia: political responses	4.2	18
Protection of minorities against violence	4.2	18
Racism in other state institutions	1.2	5
Repression of racism/xenophobia: police responses	1.2	5
Moral appeals	0.9	4
Countermobilization	0.9	4
Extreme right parties: alliances and exclusion	0.9	4
Non institutional racism: general evaluation or policy direction	0.7	3
Repression of racism/xenophobia: judicial responses	0.7	3
Racism in institutional contexts: general evaluation or policy direction	0.2	1
GENERAL XENOPHOBIC CLAIMS & EXTREME RIGHT CLAIMS		
Xenophobic claims	5.0	21
MINORITY ACTOR CLAIMS		
Pure homeland politics	0.2	1
World War II/Holocaust	0.5	2
Other minority actor claims	0.2	1
OTHER CLAIMS REGARDING EXTREME RIGHT		
General, unspecific claims	5.0	21
World War II, 3 rd Reich, etc.	0.5	2
Anti-left claims	0.9	4
Repressive measures	0.7	3
No issue	0.5	2
Total	100	424

One important aspect of the way these various issues are portrayed and presented by the multiple actors that intervene in the public sphere is the fact that there is a general moderately positive approach towards immigrants and ethnic minorities from most actors, except of course racist and extreme right organisations (Table 11). Political parties and some civil society organisations show a mildly negative stance towards immigrants or immigration. Most institutional and governmental actors show a slightly positive

position with regard to immigrant minorities, and particularly so the state executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants. Executive government are in most cases neutral, as are the police and state security agencies.

As we could expect, civil society organisations, and particularly migrant and pro-migrant organisations, are almost invariably holding positive positions towards migrant minorities in their public interventions.

Table 11. Mean position towards the issue by actors

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	Std. Deviation
Executive Governments	106	0.08	0.63
Legislatures	60	0.27	0.71
Judiciary	15	0.33	0.49
Police and security agencies	28	0	0.61
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	4	1	0.00
Other state executive agencies	4	0.25	0.50
Political parties	68	-0.10	0.88
Unions and employees	2	1	0.00
Employers organisations and firms	3	0.67	0.58
Churches	22	0.36	0.66
Media and journalists	3	0.67	0.58
Professional organisations and groups	16	0.44	0.51
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	48	0.79	0.50
Antiracist organisations and groups	1	1	-
Pro-minority organisations and groups	4	0.75	0.50
General solidarity organisations and groups	5	1.00	0.00
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	14	-0.93	0.27
Radical left organisations and groups	10	0.80	0.63
Other civil society organisations and groups	7	-0.14	0.90
Total	420	0.22	0.75

Mean from the values: -1:anti-minority, xenophobic/ 0: neutral, ambivalent, technocratic / 1: pro-minority, anti racist

6. OBJECTS OF CLAIMS

When we turn to analyse the objects of the instances of claims-making on immigration issues, the scene is dominated by debates around immigrants as a whole (30%) and by claims around religious groups, especially Muslims and Jewish (27 and 11% respectively), as shown in Table 12. References to specific national or ethnic groups are relatively infrequent, as they also are references to specific categorisations around ethnic or racial lines, which are not common in the Italian public debate, except for Roma populations.

Table 12. Identity of the object of the claim

<i>Identity of object of claim</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>
(Im)migrants/re-migrants	30.4	129
Muslim/ Islamic	26.9	114
Jewish/Israelite	11.1	47
Minorities	8.0	34
Asylum seekers	5.9	25
Religious groups	3.3	14
Black	3.1	13
Specific national or ethnic group	2.8	12
Foreigners/aliens	1.7	7
Catholic	0.2	1
Ethnic minorities/groups	0.2	1
Asian	0.2	1
Illegal aliens/immigrants	0	0
Labour migrants, contract workers	0	0
Racial minorities/groups	0	0
Migrants and minorities unspecified	0	0
War refugees	0	0
Orthodox	0	0
EU citizens	0	0
Not applicable: claim outside the thematic field	5.0	21
Not applicable: repressive measure	0.7	3
Total	100	424

In this regard, African origins of the objects of public debate are most often identified, and again Latin American immigrants are much less present in public discourses around immigration than their proportional weight would lead us to expect (Table 13). This is, undoubtedly, related to the media salience attributed to the estival crisis of boat arrivals from Africa, but also related to the salience of issues around Islamic cultural practices, more often related to Maghrebi residents.

Table 13. Nationality of the object of the claim

<i>Nationality of object of claim</i>	%	n
Not applicable: no specific minority or migrant object	76.2	323
Africa: north	8.0	34
African: other	6.8	29
Old European minorities	3.8	16
Latin American	2.1	9
Other	1.9	8
Asia: South and East	0.9	4
Other Europe	0.2	1
Total	100	424

In relation to this, Table 14 shows that there is a general consistency in the prevalence of status groups as the main identifier of the objects of claims for most types of actor that makes the claim or public intervention. However, religious groups are the object of claims-making relatively frequently for some types of actors: executives, legislatures, political parties, churches, and migrant organisations. Racial, national or hyphenated groups are seldom the object of public debates, with the exception of those interventions made by migrant and minority organisations themselves, where references to religious groups prevail.

Table 14. Identity of the object by type of actor, row percentage

	<i>Status group</i>	<i>Racial groups</i>	<i>Religious group</i>	<i>National and ethnic groups</i>	<i>Not applicable</i>	Total
Executive Governments	59	3	32	3	3	100
Legislatures	50	0	43	0	7	100
Judiciary	47	7	47	0	0	100
Police and security agencies	36	14	29	11	11	100
State executive agencies dealing specifically with migrants	100	0	0	0	0	100
Other state executive agencies	75	0	25	0	0	100
Political parties	40	4	43	3	10	100
Unions and employees	100	0	0	0	0	100
Employers organisations and firms	100	0	0	0	0	100
Churches	14	0	86	0	0	100

	<i>Status group</i>	<i>Racial groups</i>	<i>Religious group</i>	<i>National and ethnic groups</i>	<i>Not applicable</i>	Total
Media and journalists	33	0	67	0	0	100
Professional organisations and groups	44	13	44	0	0	100
Migrant and minority organisations and groups	20	0	72	6	2	100
Antiracist organisations and groups	100	0	0	0	0	100
Pro-minority organisations and groups	75	0	0	25	0	100
General solidarity organisations and groups	80	0	20	0	0	100
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	31	8	23	8	31	100
Radical left organisations and groups	80	0	10	0	10	100
Other civil society organisations and groups	86	0	0	0	14	100
Unknown actors	0	0	100	0	0	100
Total	46	3	42	3	6	100

Racial groups are more often referred to by professional organisations and groups, by police and security actors, and (logically) by racist and extreme right groups. National and ethnic groups are identified more often in the interventions by pro-minority organisations and groups, and police and security agencies.

7. SCOPE VARIABLES

The final section of our descriptive presentation of the results for Milan/Italy looks into the territorial scope of the actors, addressees, criticised actors, and issues that are included in the claims identified.

As we could expect, all of them – actors, addressees, criticised actors and issues – are most frequently national in scope (Table 16). Hence, the national arena prevails in the configuration of public debates around immigration in Milan and in Italy. Yet, it is important to note that the subnational level is also quite important in our case, especially for actors and – to a greater degree – for the issues. On the other hand, the relevance of supra- or transnational levels should not be fully disregarded, at least in what relates to the definition of the issues that are at stake on the public debate in Milan/Italy.

Table 16. Scope of actors, addressees, criticized actors and issues

<i>Scope</i>	<i>Actor</i>	<i>Addressee</i>	<i>Criticized actor</i>	<i>Issue</i>
Supra- or transnational: European	1.9	0.7	0.9	3.8
Supra- or transnational: other	0.7	0.2	0.9	7.1
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0.2	0.7	3.5	0.5
Foreign national: other	4.2	3.3	4.7	0.9
Bilateral	0	0	0	0
National	52.8	13.4	18.6	42.0
Subnational	33.0	11.1	15.3	40.6
National or subnational	5.4	4.2	6.8	5.2
Unknown: no organisation/No verbal claim	1.7	66.3	49.1	0
Total (n=524)	100	100	100	100

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In this descriptive report we have discussed the main findings that help us characterise the nature of the public discourse around immigration and immigrants in Milan. One important thing to mention is that the national level issues and actors tend to dominate the public arena in many ways.

The importance of the national level is evident in what relates to the nature of the actors that make the interventions, but importantly also in the territorial scope of the issues that make it to the news. Partly, this is due to the fact that the national government retains control of the main policy domains that have attracted most of the public attention in 2006: border control and the management of entry flows.

The main issues that shape public discourse around immigration in Milan, and Italy more generally, are related to ‘immigrant integration politics’, followed at a distance by ‘immigration, asylum and aliens politics’. From this, it almost logically follows that institutional – and in particular governmental and party – actors will prevail in the public arena given the nature of these issues.

The overall orientation of immigration politics and interventions is moderately positive, but with important actors – most notably, political parties – with more negative stances. This result entails that discursive opportunities are somewhat more open for immigrants than the structural ones, that were mildly closed for the Milanese case.

Finally, our results indicate that – as of 2006 – the public discourse in Milan and Italy with regard to migrant minorities did not include many cases of segmentation around

specific racial, ethnic or religious identities. Migrant minorities are usually referred to as status groups ('immigrants'), rather than by their racial, ethnic, national or religious affiliations. However, in the claims-making of several types of actors religious categories were relatively frequent. This points to the existence in Milan/Italy of a public discourse around immigration where religious identities – especially around Muslim-background immigrants – is becoming increasingly salient in public debates.